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PROSECUTORIAL ANALYTICS 
JASON KREAG 
ABSTRACT 
The institution of the prosecutor has more power than any other in the 
criminal justice system. What is more, prosecutorial power is often 
unreviewable as a result of limited constitutional regulation and the fact 
that it is increasingly exercised in private and semi-private settings as the 
system has become more administrative and less adversarial. Despite this 
vast, unreviewable power, prosecutors often rely on crude performance 
measures focused on conviction rates. The focus on conviction rates fails to 
capture and adequately evaluate the breadth of prosecutorial decision-
making. We can do better by fully implementing analytics as a tool to 
evaluate the prosecutorial function. This tool has revolutionized crime-
fighting. Yet, it has been conspicuously absent as a tool to improve other 
aspects of the criminal justice system. This Article demonstrates the promise 
of prosecutorial analytics to improve oversight and to promote systemic 
interests in justice, fairness, and transparency. It offers concrete examples 
of how analytics can 1) help eliminate race-based jury selection practices; 
2) minimize prosecutorial misconduct; 3) uncover whether undesirable 
arbitrary factors shape prosecutorial discretion; and 4) provide better 
metrics for the judiciary, practitioners, and the public to evaluate 
prosecutorial performance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The oral argument before the Supreme Court in Tim Foster’s case began 
with Foster’s counsel asserting, “Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the 
Court: The prosecutors in this case came to court on the morning of jury 
selection determined to strike all the black prospective jurors.”1 Beginning 
an argument with such a sweeping assertion is a risky strategy. An 
unsympathetic jurist might interrupt with a question immediately 
challenging the factual basis for the assertion. The ensuing back and forth 
may prevent discussion of the underlying substantive claim. But Foster’s 
case was different.  
Unlike the vast majority of cases involving claims pursuant to Batson v. 
 
 
 1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016) (No. 14-8349). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/5
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Kentucky,2 in which courts must determine whether a prosecutor committed 
purposeful discrimination in jury selection without access to the most 
relevant evidence—the prosecutor’s jury selection notes—Foster had the 
notes and they were before the court.3 Thus, the Court had the opportunity 
to review the contemporaneous, and un-scrubbed, evidence of the 
prosecutor’s decisions free of any post-hoc rationalizations.4 The notes were 
damning and consistent with the prosecutor’s actions.5 After striking all of 
the potential black jurors, the prosecutor appealed directly to racialized 
fears, asking the all-white jury to return a death sentence to “deter other 
people out there in the projects from doing the same again.”6 
In the typical Batson case, the Court does not have the benefit of such 
direct evidence. Without it, judges are forced to perform Batson’s critical 
third step, which requires them to be lie detectors, by simply evaluating the 
prosecutor’s demeanor to determine whether the prosecutor lied to mask 
purposeful discrimination. Even under the best of conditions, this amounts 
to guesswork.7  
There is an alternative approach. Courts could supplement their review 
with fairly basic statistical analysis and data analytics to diminish the 
demeanor-based guesswork.8 The incorporation of analytics could 
simultaneously improve judicial decisions and decrease discriminatory jury 
selection practices.  
Analytics can also help evaluate charging practices, identify misconduct, 
and uncover prosecutorial decisions based on factors that should not be 
considered.9 This Article identifies these examples to demonstrate that 
analytics is an underused tool. It argues that analytics offers promise as a 
 
 
 2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that purposeful racial discrimination in jury selection violates 
equal protection). 
 3. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1743–44 (2016) (describing the contents of the notes). The 
Author was part of Foster’s defense team during initial state post-conviction proceedings as a staff 
attorney at the Southern Center for Human Rights.  
 4. Furthermore, the conclusion that the notes accurately captured the prosecutor’s thoughts during 
jury selection was bolstered by the evidence demonstrating that the prosecutor believed the notes would 
never be made public. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3–4, Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016) 
(No. 14-8349) (explaining that Foster sought the notes at trial but was denied access); Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that the prosecutor’s decision to testify about the state’s jury 
selection practices was contingent on him not having to disclose the state’s notes).  
 5. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 38–39, (Justice Kagan questioning whether 
the state’s jury selection practices amounted to “as clear a Batson violation as a court is ever going to 
see”). 
 6. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 22.  
 7. See Hon. Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L. J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii (2015) 
(“Although we pretend otherwise, much of what we do in the law is guesswork.”). 
 8. See infra Part III.A.  
 9. See infra Part III. 
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tool to: 1) regulate prosecutors’ expanding power; 2) more accurately 
measure prosecutorial performance; and 3) improve constitutional decision-
making.  
It seeks to bring the institution of the prosecutor in line with one of 
society’s defining characteristics—a seemingly insatiable desire to measure 
everything, to record as much as possible, to quantify our actions, and to 
mine the data for trends, patterns, and distortions to solve problems and 
make better decisions. This Article refers to this process as analytics. Others 
have offered a similar definition for Big Data.10 Analytics is a better term 
here because not all of the applications of this tool to prosecutorial decision-
making involve the “three V’s” of Big Data—volume, velocity, and 
variety.11 Rather, analytics includes the use of small, large, and big data sets.  
While the prosecutorial function has largely escaped the wave of 
analytics, the technique has revolutionized law enforcement’s crime 
fighting efforts and is ubiquitous in modern life. Outside of the criminal 
justice system, the desire to measure and count things plays out on a grand 
scale12 and on the personal level.13 Organizations use this data to market 
products, measure risk, search for cures to disease, rank colleges, identify 
potential voters, and win sporting events.14 Within the criminal justice 
 
 
 10. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1920–21 (2013) 
(“‘Big Data’ is shorthand for the combination of a technology and a process. . . . Together, the technology 
and the process comprise a technique for converting data flows into a particular, highly data-intensive 
type of knowledge.”); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 
U. PA. L. REV. 327, 352 (2015) (“Big Data refers to the accumulation and analysis of unusually large 
datasets.”); Paul Ohm, The Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 339, 340 
(2013) (“‘Big Data’ has become nearly synonymous with ‘data analysis’. . . .”).  
 11. Jules J. Berman, PRINCIPLES OF BIG DATA: PREPARING, SHARING, AND ANALYZING COMPLEX 
INFORMATION xv, xx (2013).  
 12. See, e.g., T.W. Crowther et. al., Mapping Tree Density at a Global Scale, 525 NATURE 201, 
201–205 (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v525/n7568/full/nature14967.html 
(documenting an effort to count the total number of trees on earth). 
 13. See, e.g., The Quantified Self: Counting Every Moment, ECONOMIST: TECH. Q. (Mar. 3, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21548493 (describing the increased use of data collection and metrics 
for self-improvement); QUANTIFIED SELF: SELF KNOWLEDGE THROUGH NUMBERS, 
http://www.quantifiedself.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). 
 14. See generally, Lydia Ramsey, Cancer Treatment Is on the Brink of a Data Revolution, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/big-data-and-cancer-2015-9 
(describing the efforts of doctors to use extremely large datasets to assist in cancer research and 
treatment); Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Investing in the National Cancer Moonshot 
(Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/01/fact-sheet-investing-national-
cancer-moonshot; Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Empowering Students to Choose the 
College that Is Right for Them (Sept. 12, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 
2015/09/12/fact-sheet-empowering-students-choose-college-right-them (emphasizing that providing 
open access to nearly two decades of data collected from colleges and universities will enable researchers 
and organizations to create additional tools to measure college and university performance); MICHAEL 
LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2004); MONEYBALL (Columbia Pictures 
2011); MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference, http://www.sloansportsconference.com/about/ (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2016) (describing the annual conference as an outlet to “discuss the increasing role of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/5
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system, actors have been quick to adopt analytics as a crime-fighting tool, 
promoting so-called smart policing or predictive policing techniques.15  
Yet the rapid adoption of analytics as a crime-fighting tool has been 
spotty, and, at times, not thoughtful.16 More importantly, it has been almost 
entirely prosecution-based in ways that raise serious concerns about fairness 
to defendants and that makes for a lost opportunity in advancing other 
worthy prosecutorial ends. Seeing this, several scholars and policymakers 
have called for more refined reflection about the implications of its use.17 
They worry that reliance on analytics distorts values,18 risks exacerbating 
longstanding inequities in the criminal justice system,19 and masks motives 
and biases.20 As a result, they have proposed regulations that would limit 
the use of analytics as a crime-fighting tool.21 
These calls for analytics speed bumps have great merit. But they miss a 
 
 
analytics in the global sports industry”).  
 15. See infra Part I.A. See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 
WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); WALTER L. PERRY ET AL., PREDICTIVE POLICING: THE ROLE OF 
CRIME FORECASTING IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS (2013), http://www.rand.org/pubs/ 
research_reports/RR233.html.  
 16. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 15, at *29 (noting that predictive policing has developed with 
“little public oversight”).  
 17. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 10, at 336 (“Using big data may help reduce the negative 
consequences of traditional policing techniques, but at the same time may create a whole new set of 
concerns.”).  
 18. Cecilia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 537, 579 (2016) (“Labeling values and moral principles like fairness and kindness ‘evidence-
based’ is problematic, even if true. While data that support the use of procedural justice to reduce 
recidivism can reinforce the importance of those principles, the values that underlie procedural justice 
should be promoted and rewarded on their own terms.”).  
 19. See, e.g., Eric Holder, Attorney General, Address at the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyer’s 57th Annual Meeting (Aug. 1, 2014), in JUSTICE NEWS, http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-national-association-criminal-defense-lawyers-57th 
(summarizing the impact of analytics on crime-fighting but warning of “unintended consequences,” 
including, for example, the possibility that analytics in the sentencing context “may exacerbate 
unwarranted and unjust disparities that are already far too common in our criminal justice system and in 
our society”).  
 20. See, e.g., Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 825 (2010) (“Disembodied from the human beings that define, create, realize, 
and benefit from its parameters, the [law enforcement] database is easily viewed as incapable of bias in 
the way that human law enforcement agents might be.”).  
 21. See, e.g., Jennifer Skeem & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, & Recidivism: Predictive 
Bias and Disparate Impact (forthcoming) (manuscript at 36), http://ssrn.com/ abstract=2687339 
(cautioning that “risk assessment instruments should be routinely tested for predictive bias and mean 
score differences by race”); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific 
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014) (arguing that risk assessment tools for 
sentencing violate equal protection); Klingele, supra note 18, at 540 (cautioning that the careless use of 
actuarial risk assessment tools and other evidence-based practices has “the potential to thwart long-term 
efforts to decrease mass incarceration by inadvertently expanding the scope of state control over the 
lives of justice-involved individuals and their communities”).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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crucial step: expanding the use of analytics to even the playing field. This 
Article seeks to effect a better analytics balance in the criminal justice arena, 
proposing specific ways of deploying analytics to serve better prosecutorial 
justice, fairness, and transparency, and to assure that defense-specific 
interests are part of the data calculus. It argues that analytics can be a 
powerful justice-enhancing, bias-detecting, and innocence-uncovering 
tool.22  
The need for defendant- and fairness-sensitive analytics is especially 
compelling when applied to criminal prosecution. The prosecutor is unique 
in the criminal justice system because of her near unreviewable power and 
discretion.23 Furthermore, the prosecutor’s power has grown in absolute and 
comparative terms over the last several decades.24 Yet, prosecutors and 
those who observe them still often rely on crude measures of their 
performance, i.e., crime rates and conviction rates. These measures 
overlook important questions about how prosecutors exercise their 
discretion in charging defendants, negotiating plea deals, meeting 
constitutional and ethical disclosure obligations, and, among other 
decisions, selecting juries.25 These factors should be considered in addition 
to crime rates and conviction rates when evaluating whether prosecutors 
adequately serve broad interests in justice, fairness, and transparency.  
The existing regulatory regime for prosecutors is inadequate to protect 
these systemic interests.26 Many prosecutorial decisions are insulated 
completely from the reach of constitutional and ethical regulations. And 
where applicable, the Constitution and ethical regulations only provide 
minimal guidance. The democratic process fills too little of this regulatory 
void,27 because the work of the prosecutor increasingly takes place in 
 
 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2009) (“No government official in America has as much unreviewable power and 
discretion as the prosecutor.”).  
 24. See infra Part II.A. 
 25. See infra Part II.B. 
 26. The consistent drip of Brady violations provides evidence that the existing regulatory regime 
does not adequately incentivize prosecutors to meet their constitutional obligations. See, e.g., United 
States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“There is an epidemic of 
Brady violations abroad in the land.”); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1533, 1544–47 (2010) (summarizing studies documenting that prosecutors who commit 
misconduct are rarely punished). See also Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net 
to Ensnare More Than the Unapologetic Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1075, 1077 (2011) (“[V]irtually every commentator (and numerous judges) who have studied [jury 
selection practices] have concluded that race-based juror strikes continue to plague American trials.”).  
 27. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 728 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Under our system 
of government, the primary check against prosecutorial abuse is a political one.”); Bibas, supra note 23, 
at 983 (“[T]he public suffers from chronic misperceptions about how the criminal justice system actually 
works.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/5
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private or semi-private proceedings,28 and prosecutors’ broad discretion 
leaves prosecutorial elections susceptible to manipulation.29  
Analytics can help. Analytics can mine historical data to help identify 
prosecutors who might be more likely to commit misconduct in the future. 
It can help identify prosecutors or prosecutorial offices that engage in or are 
more likely to engage in race-based jury selection practices. It can also help 
identify undesirable trends in charging and plea bargaining. 
Simultaneously, it can provide the public with better data to evaluate 
prosecutorial performance. We are unlikely ever to approach the equivalent 
of open-source prosecuting, but analytics gets us closer. And in doing so, it 
promises dramatic increases in transparency.  
Extending analytics beyond the crime-fighting side of the criminal 
justice system will require access to the relevant data – data that is often 
controlled by or in the possession of the prosecutor. Some prosecutors have 
demonstrated a willingness to share data with outside evaluators to measure 
justice and fairness.30 In other instances, public interest organizations and 
researchers have undertaken herculean data collection and data fusion 
efforts to evaluate prosecutorial decision-making.31 These efforts provide 
proof for the concept that analytics can improve the institution of the 
prosecutor, and they should be a catalyst to do more.  
This Article thus proposes a new regime of mandatory reporting from 
prosecutorial agencies to ensure that the data is available to evaluate the 
prosecutorial function in every jurisdiction. The proposal is akin to the 
 
 
 28. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 2173 (2014); Bibas, supra note 23 at 961 (“[P]rosecution is a low-visibility process about which 
the public has poor information and little right to participate.”).  
 29. See, e.g., Brendan Nyhan & M. Marit Rehavi, Tipping the Scales?: Testing for Political 
Influence on Public Corruption Prosecutions 3 (June 5, 2015), http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/ 
files/pegroup/files/nyhanrehavi2015.pdf?m=1444765374 (analyzing the timing and results of public 
corruption prosecutions from 1993 to 2008). 
 30. See BESIKI LUKA KUTATELADZE & NANCY R. ADNILORO, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 
PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE IN NEW YORK COUNTY – TECHNICAL REPORT (2014), 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/race-and-prosecution-manhattan-technical. 
pdf (reporting the results of a partnership between the New York County District Attorney’s Office and 
the Vera Institute of Justice). 
 31. See, e.g., AMERICA’S TOP FIVE DEADLIEST PROSECUTORS: HOW OVERZEALOUS 
PERSONALITIES DRIVE THE DEATH PENALTY, HARV. L. SCH., FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT (2016) 
[hereinafter DEADLIEST PROSECUTORS] (identifying outlier prosecutors with respect to seeking capital 
convictions), http://fairpunishment.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/FPP-Top5Report_FINAL.pdf; 
Ursula Noye, Blackstrikes: A Study of the Racially Disparate Use of Peremptory Challenges by the 
Caddo Parish District Attorney’s Office, REPRIEVE., Aug. 2015, https://blackstrikes.com/; Arm Yourself 
With Information, R3 INVESTIGATIONS, http://r3investigations.com/sentencing.html (last visited Feb. 
15, 2016) (offering a private database to compare charging decisions and plea offers in Maricopa County, 
AZ); TRACFED, http://tracfed.syr.edu/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (compiling data on federal 
government activity). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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certified disclosures corporate executives of public companies must make 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the reports law enforcement officials make 
to the FBI to support the Uniform Crime Reporting Program.32 Mandatory 
collection and disclosure requirements will ensure that analytics can be used 
to advance systemic interests in justice, fairness, and transparency, not just 
as a crime-fighting tool.  
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I summarizes the expansion of 
analytics as a crime-fighting tool and explains why the tool has not reached 
other aspects of the criminal justice system. Part II makes the case for using 
analytics to serve broad interests in justice and the often overlapping, but 
nonetheless narrower, interests of defendants and potential defendants. It 
discusses the spike in prosecutorial power and presents analytics as a tool 
to check that power and to better evaluate prosecutorial performance. Part 
II concludes by adding that the expanded use of analytics to evaluate the 
institution of the prosecutor will have the salutary effect of improving 
decision-making.  
Part III shows how this might happen. It cites several specific aspects of 
prosecutorial decision-making – jury selection, charging decisions, and 
prosecutorial disclosure obligations – where analytics can improve the 
relevant decisions. Part IV begins to sketch out a policy for ensuring that 
the data necessary to review the prosecutorial function will be collected and 
made available. Finally, it explores some of the risks of the expanded use of 
analytics in the criminal justice system.  
I. THE RISE OF ANALYTICS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
For decades the law enforcement side of the criminal justice system has 
recognized the utility of collecting, sorting, and searching large data sets to 
assist in fighting crime.33 Not surprisingly, law enforcement eagerly 
collected and tracked new types of information as advances in technology 
and storage capacity made doing so possible.34 This advancement has 
reached a point where it is realistic to imagine a time when it will be 
“feasible and affordable for the government to record, store, and analyze 
 
 
 32. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 302, 906 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 
and 18 U.S.C. § 1350) (listing certified disclosure requirements); Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Uniform Crime Reporting, https://ucr.fbi.gov/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (describing the FBI’s Uniform 
Crime Reporting Program).  
 33. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (“[P]rediction of future criminal conduct is 
an essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system.”); 
Murphy, supra note 20, at 805–10 (describing law enforcement databases).  
 34. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1975 (2013) (“Law enforcement agencies 
routinely have used scientific advancements in their standard procedures for the identification of 
arrestees.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/5
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nearly everything people do.”35 
In contrast to the eager acceptance and development of analytics as a 
crime-fighting tool, analytics has rarely been used to promote defense 
interests and broader systemic interests in justice and fairness. This Part 
summarizes the expanded use of analytics as a crime-fighting tool. It offers 
several explanations for the uneven adoption of analytics in the criminal 
justice system.  
A. Analytics as a Crime-Fighting Tool 
The influence of analytics as a crime-fighting tool is extensive.36 It 
reaches jurisdictions of all size37 and a wide range of crimes.38 Furthermore, 
it influences all stages of crime-fighting. The story is a familiar one: the 
embrace of analytics is another example of law enforcement’s ability to 
identify and exploit the crime-fighting capabilities of new technologies.39 
The expansion of analytics as a crime-fighting tool has been fueled by 
partnerships with private industry, government funding, and private 
foundation support.40 
On the front end of the criminal justice system, law enforcement collects 
more data than ever before and mines this data to help prevent and solve 
crimes.41 It collects this data using an assortment of tools, including 
automated license plate readers, facial recognition tools, cell phone tower 
 
 
 35. See Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and 
Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 15–16 (2016).  
 36. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing By Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. 
L. REV. 35, 35 (2014) (“The age of ‘big data’ has come to policing.”).  
 37. See, e.g., Bryce Clayton Newell, Local Law Enforcement Jumps on the Big Data Bandwagon: 
Automated License Plate Recognition Systems, Information Privacy, and Access to Government 
Information, 66 ME. L. REV. 397 (2014).  
 38. See, e.g., Frank J. Sensenbrenner & Margaret Ryznar, The Law and Economics of Insider 
Trading, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1155 (2015) (demonstrating the ability of advanced analytics to help 
prosecutors identify and prosecute insider trading).  
 39. See, e.g., Jason Kreag, Letting Innocence Suffer: The Need for Defense Access to the Law 
Enforcement DNA Database, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 805, 812–13 (2015) (describing law enforcement’s 
quick adoption of DNA technology to solve crime).  
 40. See, e.g., OLIVER ROEDER ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME 
DECLINE? 4 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Crime_rate_ 
report_web.pdf (concluding that CompStat-type policing reduced crime by 5 to 15 percent); POLICE 
EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, COMPSTAT: ITS ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND FUTURE IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2013), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PERF-Compstat.pdf (describing 
the evolution of CompStat); Criminal Justice: Data-Driven Decision Making, LAURA AND JOHN 
ARNOLD FOUNDATION, http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/initiative/criminal-justice/data-driven-
desicion-making/ (“LJAF is funding the development of research and data centers that will help criminal 
justice officials make more objective, evidence-based decisions.”).  
 41. See, e.g., Joh, supra note 36. 
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simulators, video surveillance cameras, mobile x-ray vans, and gunshot 
detection sensors.42 Law enforcement supplements the information it 
collects with information it obtains from private data aggregators.43 Once 
collected, often without implicating Fourth Amendment protections, this 
data is fused into massive, searchable databases44 and used to predict crimes 
before they occur, to identify bad actors before they act, to identify victims 
before they are harmed, to identify suspects after a crime occurs, and to 
allocate scarce policing resources.45 For example, the Chicago Police 
Department uses a proprietary algorithm to collect and mine data to create 
what it calls the Strategic Subject List, a list of individuals ranked 
“according to their probability of being involved in a shooting or murder.”46 
The Chicago Police Department believes the tool has been effective, 
claiming that 85 percent of Chicagoans shot in the first six months of 2016 
were on the Strategic Subject List.47  
When police develop a suspect and prosecutors initiate charges, 
analytics is used to influence decisions about pretrial detention.48 
Prosecutors also use analytics to help determine whether and what type of 
plea bargain to offer.49 And after a conviction, the system uses another 
version of analytics—risk assessment tools—to help influence sentencing 
 
 
 42. See, e.g., Hon. Brian L. Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications of the Government’s Use 
of Cell Tower Dumps in Its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2013) (describing the 
scope of cell tower simulators); Conor Friedersdorf, The NYPD Is Using Mobile X-ray Vans to Spy on 
Unknown Targets, ATLANTIC (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 2015/10/the-
nypd-is-using-mobile-x-rays-to-spy-on-unknown-targets/411181/; Gunshot Detectors, Calling the 
Shots: How Gunshot-Detecting Microphones Help Police Curb Crime, ECONOMIST (Sept. 13, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21617018/ (describing Washington DC’s police “ShotSpotter” 
system).  
 43. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (holding that government access of third-
party records is not a Fourth Amendment search). See generally Jane Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 
94 TEX. L. REV. 205, 212–18 (2015) (describing the reach of the third-party doctrine).  
 44. See Murphy, supra note 20, at 805–10 (describing numerous law enforcement databases).  
 45. See generally PERRY ET AL., supra note 15; Predictive Policing, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
JUSTICE (June 9, 2014), http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/strategies/predictive-policing/ 
Pages/welcome.aspx.  
 46. See CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, Special Order S10-05, (Oct. 6, 2015), http://directives. 
chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57bf0-1456faf9-bfa14-570a-a2deebf33c56ae59.html (describing 
CPD’s procedures for notifying individuals who appear on the list).  
 47. Jeremy Gorner, With Violence Up, Chicago Police Focus on a List of Likeliest to Kill, Be 
Killed, CHI. TRIB. (Jul. 22, 2016). But see Jessica Saunders et al., Predictions Put Into Practice: A Quasi-
Experimental Evaluation of Chicago’s Predictive Policing Pilot, 12 J. EXP. CRIMINOLOGY 347 (2016) 
(evaluating 2013 data and concluding that individuals on the Strategic Subject List were not more likely 
to be involved in shootings).  
 48. See Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245, 1268 (2016) (discussing how 
analytics is changing bail determinations).  
 49. See Chip Brown, Cyrus Vance Jr’s ‘Moneyball’ Approach to Crime, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 
7, 2014) (describing how better data management has affected plea bargaining), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/magazine/cyrus-vance-jrs-moneyball-approach-to-
crime.html?_r=0. 
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outcomes.50 Similar risk assessment tools are used for parole decisions.51 
And even after formal punishment and supervision ends, crime-fighting 
analytics tail individuals as records of arrests and convictions remain 
sprinkled throughout law enforcement and private databases.52  
Despite its extensive use as a crime-fighting tool, there are few examples 
of analytics being used to serve defense interests.53 The remainder of this 
Part explains the uneven adoption of analytics. It first argues that this is a 
result of constitutional criminal procedure’s small data focus. It then 
explains that political considerations, logistical challenges, and structural 
and competency limitations have contributed to the uneven adoption of 
analytics.  
B. Constitutional Criminal Procedure’s Small Data Focus 
Constitutional criminal procedure has simultaneously cleared the path 
for law enforcement to adopt analytics and hindered the use of analytics as 
a tool to promote defense interests and broader interests in justice. On the 
crime-fighting side, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment rulings have 
largely left analytics to develop outside of constitutional restrictions.54 At 
the same time, the Court’s interpretation of the constitutional principles that 
regulate prosecutorial decisions have insulated prosecutors from the wave 
of analytics that reaches the rest of society.  
The Court’s narrow definition of what constitutes a search and thus 
triggers Fourth Amendment protection insulates law enforcement’s 
collection of massive data sets from constitutional review.55 For example, 
 
 
 50. See generally, Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B. C. L. REV. 671 (2015) 
(analyzing the increased use of data-driven risk assessment tools in sentencing); Starr, supra note 21 
(same).  
 51. See generally, Klingele, supra note 18 (exploring the use of risk assessment tools for 
probationers and parolees).  
 52. See Kevin Lapp, American Criminal Record Exceptionalism, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 303, 
305–06 (2016); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 13 (2010) (“Once released, former prisoners enter a hidden underworld of legalized 
discrimination and permanent social exclusion.”).  
 53. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Laurin, Gideon By the Numbers: The Emergence of Evidence-Based 
Practice in Indigent Defense, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 356 (2015) (“To date, the substantive 
performance standards that guide defense practice are largely the product of professional experience 
and, ultimately, guesswork about how inputs relate to outputs.”); Pamela Metzger & Andrew Guthrie 
Ferguson, Defending Data, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1057 (2015); Ronald F. Wright & Ralph A. Peeples, 
Criminal Defense Lawyer Moneyball: A Demonstration Project, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1221 (2013).  
 54. But cf. Ric Simmons, Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock the Potential of the Big 
Data in Our Criminal Justice System, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947 (2016).  
 55. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (limiting the 
definition of search for Fourth Amendment purposes to government actions that intrude upon reasonable 
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despite the fact that the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits searches of 
a suspect’s cell phone without a warrant,56 the third-party doctrine holds that 
law enforcement can collect similar information from the suspect’s cell 
phone provider without implicating Fourth Amendment protections.57 
Furthermore, information knowingly made public is also not subject to 
Fourth Amendment protections.58 Thus, the police are free to use automated 
license plate readers to identify and track vehicles on our streets.59 And they 
can build DNA databases by collecting abandoned DNA without 
implicating Fourth Amendment protections.60  
While the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has allowed the 
growth of analytics as a crime-fighting tool, constitutional criminal 
procedure has simultaneously insulated prosecutorial decision-making from 
its reach. For example, McCleskey v. Kemp61 and Batson v. Kentucky62 rely 
on a decidedly small data approach to constitutional interpretation, focusing 
the analysis on the prosecutorial decisions made within a case and rejecting 
the relevance of decisions made in comparable cases. Warren McCleskey 
challenged his conviction and sentence by claiming that Georgia’s 
administration of the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment and 
equal protection because of its racially discriminatory application.63 To 
support his claim, McCleskey presented a comprehensive, statewide 
statistical analysis of Georgia’s capital punishment system demonstrating 
that “defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely 
to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing black[] 
 
 
expectations of privacy). In Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013), the Court clarified that 
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test is not the only definition of a Fourth Amendment search. 
Rather, “[w]hen ‘the Government obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons, houses, 
papers, or effects, ‘a “search” within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment’ has ‘undoubtedly 
occurred.’” Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 n.3 (2012)). 
 56. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 57. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (holding that the voluntary sharing of 
information with a third-party nullifies one’s expectation of privacy in that information). See generally 
Bambauer, supra note 43 (proposing modernization of the third-party doctrine to account for law 
enforcement’s ability to use modern computing to perform narrow targeted searches of the information 
it collects).  
 58. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (“The Fourth Amendment protection of 
the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing 
by a home on public thoroughfares.”); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”).  
 59. See Joh, supra note 35, at 22–24 (2016) (describing the quick adoption of this crime-fighting 
tool and its extensive reach as police build large data sets).  
 60. See Jason Kreag, Going Local: The Fragmentation of Genetic Surveillance, 95 B.U. L. REV. 
1491, 1546 (2015).  
 61. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 62. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 63. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286.  
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[victims].”64 While not big data, McCleskey certainly relied on advanced 
data analytics to prove his constitutional claim.  
The Court was not impressed, and it swiftly pushed aside the relevance 
of the study. It took a small data approach, concluding that McCleskey 
missed the mark by focusing on statewide trends.65 Rather, to prevail he 
needed to prove the existence of discriminatory purpose in his case, 
something that the statistical analysis was incapable of doing.66 The Court 
dismissed McCleskey’s Eighth Amendment claim with equal swiftness. It 
characterized the study results as indicating disparate outcomes that merely 
“correlate[d] with race” and added that such a result was “an inevitable part 
of our criminal justice system.”67 Because the discretion granted to 
prosecutors and juries was the source of the inevitability, the Court held that 
there was no Eighth Amendment violation.68  
Notably, in rejecting McCleskey’s Eighth Amendment claim with a 
small data approach, the Court reasoned that it was protecting the 
foundation of the criminal justice system. It feared the future, where similar 
analytics-based constitutional claims might “throw[] into serious question 
the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”69 The Court 
reasoned:  
 
 
 64. Id. at 287. See DAVID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL 
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 392–419 (1990) (describing the study). One of McCleskey’s lawyers 
described the statistical study as follows:  
Suffice it to say that David [Baldus] and his colleagues examined a large sample of Georgia 
homicide convictions between 1973 and 1979 and collected information about more than five 
hundred factors pertinent to sentencing in each case. They subjected this information to an 
extensive array of statistical procedures, including multiple-regression analyses based upon 
alternative models that controlled for as few as ten or as many as 230 sentencing factors—all 
of the factors specified by Georgia law for consideration in capital sentencing and virtually 
every other factor recognized in the legal and criminological literature as likely to affect the 
choice of life or death.  
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty Before and After McCleskey, 
39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 43 (2007) (footnote omitted).  
 65. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292–93 (“[T]o prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey 
must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. He offers no evidence 
specific to his own case that would support an inference that racial considerations played a part in his 
sentence. Instead, he relies solely on the Baldus study.”).  
 66. Id. at 293, n.11 (highlighting that the statistical models were just models and unable to establish 
proof of discriminatory purpose in any individual case). Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) 
(holding that in the employment discrimination context statistical evidence demonstrating a disparate 
impact is not sufficient to succeed on an equal protection claim without evidence of purposeful 
discrimination).  
 67. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312. 
 68. Id. at 311 (“McCleskey’s argument that the Constitution condemns the discretion allowed 
decisionmakers in the Georgia capital sentencing system is antithetical to the fundamental role of 
discretion in our criminal justice system.”).  
 69. Id. at 315.  
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[S]ince McCleskey’s claim relates to the race of his victim, other 
claims could apply with equally logical force to statistical disparities 
that correlate with the race or sex of other actors in the criminal 
justice system, such as defense attorneys or judges. Also, there is no 
logical reason that such a claim need be limited to racial or sexual 
basis. If arbitrary and capricious punishment is the touchstone under 
the Eighth Amendment, such a claim could—at least in theory—be 
based upon any arbitrary variable, such as the defendant’s facial 
characteristics, or the physical attractiveness of the defendant or the 
victim, that some statistical study indicates may be influential in jury 
decisionmaking. As these examples illustrate, there is no limiting 
principle to the type of challenge brought by McCleskey.70 
McCleskey’s small data approach has had a lasting impact. Professor 
Anthony Amsterdam described it this way: “[S]o long as McCleskey v. 
Kemp remains the law, no purely statistical showing of racial differentials 
in the imposition or execution of death sentences will suffice to make out a 
violation of the federal Constitution.”71 Other scholars have noted its reach 
beyond the application of the death penalty.72 
In Batson, the Court demonstrated a similar commitment to small data 
constitutional interpretation.73 Batson overruled Swain v. Alabama, which 
required that defendants prove a sustained pattern of race-based jury strikes 
to establish an equal protection violation.74 At the time, this made sense, as 
practical realities made it nearly impossible for defendants (and courts) to 
collect the aggregate jury strike information necessary to meet Swain’s 
burden.75 Of course, the modern reality of high-power computing and 
automated record keeping make these concerns less powerful.76 
 
 
 70. Id. at 317–18 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248 (“A rule that a 
statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in 
practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise serious 
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and 
licensing statutes . . . .”). 
 71. Amsterdam, supra note 64, at 45. 
 72. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Mukul Bakhshi, New Frameworks for Racial Equality in the 
Criminal Law, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007) (“McCleskey was one of the first decisions in 
an ongoing historical process that has expanded the discretion of legal decision-makers—from police 
through corrections officials—and simultaneously insulated them from meaningful constitutional 
challenges.”). 
 73. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (“[A] defendant may establish a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s 
exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial.”). 
 74. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).  
 75. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 92 (1986) (criticizing Swain for demanding a “crippling burden of 
proof”).  
 76. See infra Part III.A.  
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Nevertheless, in focusing the equal protection analysis on the prosecutor’s 
actions in a single case,77 Batson represents an example of small data 
constitutional analysis, and this small data focus has impeded the reach of 
analytics in the criminal justice system.  
The Court’s ineffective assistance of counsel cases also reflect a small 
data approach to constitutional decision-making. The majority opinion and 
Justice Marshall’s dissent in Strickland v. Washington,78 demonstrate the 
point. Justice Marshall emphasized the trade-like aspects of criminal 
defense. He believed that many aspects of defense work are routine and 
could be evaluated with checklists.79 This approach would be filled with 
determinable, and for the most part objective, variables that would fit 
seamlessly with the use of analytics.80 But the Court rejected Justice 
Marshall’s approach. Rather, it emphasized the artist-like qualities of 
criminal defense, arguing that the highly nuanced nature of each case 
rendered a formalistic approach to ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
unworkable.81  
Under the Court’s case-specific, small data approach, there is less room 
for analytics to grow as a tool for defense interests.82 Small data 
constitutional interpretation makes it less likely that data will be collected 
and organized, particularly when defendants are already forced to prioritize 
issues and maximize scarce resources. If the data is not collected, or is not 
collected correctly, it cannot be mined for trends and patterns to help 
decision-making.  
C. Factors Contributing to the Analytics Imbalance 
In addition to constitutional criminal procedure’s small data focus, 
political realities (and pathologies), structural dynamics, and institutional 
competency limitations contribute to the uneven adoption of analytics. In 
 
 
 77. Notably, Batson did not fully refute Swain’s holding. That is, even though Batson lowered the 
Swain burden by relieving defendants from the crippling burden of demonstrating a pattern of race-based 
strikes over time, nothing in Batson prevents defendants from relying on systemic evidence of race-
based strikes. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–97 (noting that courts must consider “all relevant circumstances”).  
 78. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
 79. Id. at 709 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing for the use of “uniform standards” to evaluate 
many aspects of criminal defense work).  
 80. Id. (noting that “conferring with one’s client, making timely objections . . . and filing a notice 
of appeal” are objective measures and could be used to evaluate effectiveness).  
 81. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89 (“No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can 
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of 
legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.”).  
 82. This is not to say that analytics is not a useful tool for evaluating the provision of criminal 
defense services. See supra note 53.  
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Trial by Machine, Professor Andrea Roth explores “the rise of mechanized 
criminal adjudication.”83 She contrasts mechanized criminal adjudication, 
which she argues has transformed the presentation of evidence at trial,84 jury 
deliberations,85 and sentencing,86 with what preceded it, a human-driven 
system of adjudication that relied on human perception, complex judgments 
about what constitutes a crime, and discretionary sentencing schemes.87 
Professor Roth’s insightful analysis of the transition to a machine-driven 
adjudicatory system finds fault with the fact that this transition has not 
developed uniformly, favoring prosecutors as opposed to defendants.88 The 
same has been true for analytics. This Section explains why the criminal 
justice system has not used analytics to aid defendants or promote broader 
systematic goals of fairness and justice.  
1. Political Considerations 
There are three interrelated political factors that explain why analytics 
has been more quickly adopted to serve crime-fighting interests as opposed 
to defense interests or broader interests in justice. First, criminal defendants 
and potential criminal defendants are politically weak, particularly when 
compared to law enforcement interests.89 Second, extending analytics to 
defense interests will impose costs on law enforcement and prosecutors, but 
law enforcement and prosecutors will only receive part of the benefit from 
this expansion.90 For example, requiring prosecutors to collect data on their 
 
 
 83. See Roth, supra note 48, at 1252.  
 84. Id. at 1253 (characterizing the changes in the manner in which evidence is presented at trial as 
a move away from the “importance of the human senses” toward the “silent testimony of instruments” 
(citing Mirjan R. Damaška, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 143 (1997))).  
 85. Id. at 1264 (documenting how changes in substantive laws have diminished the need for jurors 
to exercise “complex moral decision making” in rendering verdicts).  
 86. Id. at 1266–69.  
 87. Id. at 1253 (discussing the reduced role for “percipient and human witnesses in proving guilt”); 
id. at 1264 (contrasting the modern criminal justice system with its past form, where the “jury had 
significant leeway to engage in complex moral decision making when determining guilt”).  
 88. Id. at 1252–53 (arguing that the mechanization of adjudication has been dominated by law 
enforcement interests seeking to minimize false negatives—“crimes that go undetected”—as opposed 
to seeking to minimize false positives, which would include wrongful convictions and excessive 
punishment). 
 89. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 267 
(“Potential criminal defendants are not exactly a powerful lobby in legislative hallways, so legislators 
tend to hear from only one side—the government’s side.”); Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the 
Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law 
Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 504 (2013) (noting that legislative efforts to provide 
privacy protections often reflect law enforcement’s powerful lobbying efforts); William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 508 n.5 (2001) [hereinafter Pathological 
Politics] (“[W]ith rare exceptions, legislators listen only to arguments that favor broader [criminal] 
liability rules.”).  
 90. Cf. Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1131 
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charging practices91 will, at a minimum, generate costs related to the 
collection and storage of the data. And while prosecutors will incur some of 
the benefits of this data collection, for example by using it to improve 
internal procedures or to evaluate individual prosecutors,92 some of the 
benefits will not be fully internalized. Third, law enforcement officers are 
incentivized to focus on crime-fighting capabilities as opposed to justice-
promoting qualities. This is true even if a new technique offers potential to 
fight crime while simultaneously serving defense interests and broader 
interests in fairness and justice.93  
Market interests amplify these political dynamics that have contributed 
to the analytics imbalance in the criminal justice system. Many of the 
analytics-based crime-fighting tools have been developed by industry.94 
Industry interests recognize the pool of stable customers—prosecutor’s 
offices and law enforcement agencies—and recognize that these customers 
are driven by crime rates and conviction rates.95 In turn, crime rates and 
convictions rates drive funding. A stable customer base and stable funding 
streams incentivize industry to develop analytics tools focused on crime 
fighting. The same political and resource landscape does not exist on the 
defense side of the criminal justice system.    
2. Structural Limitations 
Important structural factors contribute to the analytics imbalance. The 
centralized and hierarchical nature of prosecuting agencies and law 
enforcement organizations allows leaders in these organizations to more 
quickly bring about sweeping changes by adopting new policies. But there 
is not an equivalent centralized power source on the defense side, where 
 
 
(2013) (concluding that the lack of data on policing practices is the result of the fact that “police chiefs 
and politicians experience much of the cost of increased investment in obtaining information . . . but 
usually internalize only some of the benefits of improved policy”).  
 91. See infra Part IV.B. 
 92. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 134 (2008) 
(documenting the practice in New Orleans of evaluating line prosecutors based on data collected about 
charging decisions).  
 93. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 811 (2012) (concluding 
that law enforcement is “usually better rewarded for maintaining order and reducing crime than 
protecting civil rights.”).  
 94. See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, COMPSTAT: ITS ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND 
FUTURE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2013), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PERF-
Compstat.pdf (describing the evolution of CompStat); Predictive Crime Fighting, IBM, http://www-
03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/crimefighting/ (describing NYPD’s partnership with IBM 
to create CompStat).  
 95. Cf. Kreag, supra note 54, at 1506–07 (describing how corporate interests have contributed to 
the expansion of local DNA databases designed to address high-volume property crime). 
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client-specific outcomes dominate as opposed to broader systemic interests.  
The changes instituted by Manhattan District Attorney Cy Vance 
exemplify how policy changes can happen quickly on the prosecution side. 
When Vance took office in 2010, he prioritized incorporating analytics into 
prosecutorial decisions.96 Vance created the Crime Strategies Unit to 
develop “intelligence-driven prosecution” techniques.97 The backbone of 
this unit is an automated database system—the Arrest Alert System—that 
notifies prosecutors when a “priority defendant”98 has a new police 
encounter. The system delivers immediate access to the full range of 
information law enforcement has on the priority defendant even if the 
triggering arrest was for a minor matter. This allows prosecutors to tailor 
bail recommendations, charging decisions, and plea-bargaining strategies to 
defendants based not only on the immediate case, but also on the 
defendant’s complete law enforcement file.99 Vance’s Executive Assistant 
District Attorney described the adoption of analytics succinctly. He 
explained:  
It’s the ‘Moneyball’ approach to crime . . . . The tool is data; the 
benefit, public safety and justice—whom are we going to put in jail? 
If you have 10 guys dealing drugs, which one do you focus on? The 
assistant district attorneys know the rap sheets, they have the police 
statements like before, but now they know if you lift the left sleeve 
you’ll find a gang tattoo and if you look you’ll see a scar where the 
defendant was once shot in the ankle. Some of the defendants are 
often surprised we know so much about them.100 
Outside of New York, other prosecutors have turned to analytics to assist 
prosecutorial decisions.101 The New Orleans District Attorney’s Office was 
an early adopter of analytics. Beginning in 1988, the District Attorney 
“instructed his attorneys to keep an unusually rich computerized record of 
 
 
 96. See Brown, supra note 49, at 24.  
 97. Id.; see also, INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN PROSECUTION / CRIME STRATEGIES UNIT, The New York 
County District Attorney’s Office, http://manhattanda.org/intelligence-driven-prosecution-crime-
strategies-unit (describing the Crime Strategies Unit). 
 98. See INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN PROSECUTION / CRIME STRATEGIES UNIT, The New York County 
District Attorney’s Office, http://manhattanda.org/intelligence-driven-prosecution-crime-strategies-
unit.  
 99. See Brown, supra note 49.  
 100. Id. at 25. 
 101. The Manhattan District Attorney welcomes invitations to share its techniques about 
“Intelligence-Driven Prosecution” with other law enforcement agencies. See INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN 
PROSECUTION / CRIME STRATEGIES UNIT, The New York County District Attorney’s Office, 
http://manhattanda.org/intelligence-driven-prosecution-crime-strategies-unit, which includes a link for 
other prosecutors to request information about the program.  
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their prosecutorial choices and reasoning,”102 focusing on decisions about 
whether and when to decline prosecution.103 Each time prosecutors declined 
to prosecute a case, they were required to record the reasons for the 
declination.104 Supervisors used the data to evaluate prosecutor 
performance.105 
In contrast with prosecutorial-led initiatives to incorporate analytics, on 
the defense side there is no equivalent of the elected prosecutor who has the 
power, resources, and access to data to develop analytics for defendants to 
use.106 The insiders in the system—defendants and defense attorneys—
focus on individual cases for the most part.107 In addition, resource 
constraints limit the ability of defense insiders to explore analytics as a 
defense tool.108 This often leaves public interest organizations and outside 
researchers to fill the void by demonstrating how analytics can benefit 
defense interests and serve broader interests in justice and fairness.109  
3. Measurement Challenges 
The uneven adoption of analytics is also related to the mechanics of 
gathering and measuring data. Put simply, some things are easier to measure 
than others. And there is a natural tendency to focus resources on those 
things that are easier to measure and quantify. In the aggregate, prosecutors 
 
 
 102. Miller & Wright, supra note 92, at 129. See id. at 135 (documenting that the database collected 
information for prosecutorial decisions from 1988 to 1999).  
 103. Id. at 134.  
 104. Id. (“For many years, the office routines in New Orleans called for prosecutors to declare a 
reason (and only one reason) for any decision to decline prosecution . . . . The screening prosecutors 
chose their reasons from a standardized office list and recorded their reasons in computerized format . . . 
.”).  
 105. Id. (reporting that supervisors “routinely used the data to evaluate the timeliness of an 
attorney’s work and to make sure that a single prosecutor did not decline charges at an unusually high 
or low rate”). 
 106. In some jurisdictions, county or statewide public defender offices might fill some of this void. 
However, even if we assume that these organizations have sufficient resources to take on this new role, 
these offices will not often have access to relevant data. See infra Part IV.B. (explaining the need for 
mandatory disclosure rules for prosecutorial agencies to build the necessary data sets).  
 107. Occasionally, individual casework uncovers systemic injustices and misconduct. For example, 
public defender Scott Saunders uncovered the widespread misconduct surrounding law enforcement and 
prosecutorial reliance on informants in Orange County, California in a single case. See generally 
PATRICK DIXON ET AL., ORANGE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY INFORMANT POLICIES & PRACTICES 
EVALUATION COMMITTEE REPORT (2015) (outlining proposed reforms responding to the uncovered 
misconduct).  
 108. But see supra note 53. 
 109. See, e.g., FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT, http://fairpunishment.org/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2016); 
QUATTRONE CENTER FOR THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, https://www.law.upenn.edu/ 
institutes/quattronecenter/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2016); VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.vera.org/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).  
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measure success based on conviction rates and crime rates, variables that 
are easily quantified, tracked, and compared.110 For example, in explaining 
his decision to expand data-driven decision making in the Manhattan 
District Attorney’s Office, District Attorney Vance pointed to crime rates 
as the motivating factor.111  
While prosecutors can easily turn to comprehensive measures of crime 
rates and conviction rates to guide their adoption of analytics, there is not 
an equivalent comprehensive measure to guide the adoption of defense-
centered analytics.112 It is more challenging to identify and measure proxies 
and determinable variables for fairness and justice than it is for crime-
fighting-driven analytics, which can default to conviction and crime rates. 
This does not mean that it is not possible.113 Rather, the measurement 
challenges simply help explain why analytics as a crime-fighting tool has 
developed quicker than as a tool to serve defense interests.  
4. Competency Limitations 
The institutional competency of courts contributes to the analytics 
imbalance.114 These limitations are of two types. First, there is the question 
of whether the judiciary possesses the ability to reliably evaluate, analyze, 
and weigh complex statistical information that is often a part of analytics. 
Second, courts often point to limitations in judicial competency as a reason 
to defer to the political process to evaluate prosecutorial discretion.  
With respect to the first question, judges are often reluctant to 
incorporate complex statistical analysis in their judicial reasoning. For 
example, in Craig v. Boren,115 after evaluating and rejecting statistical 
evidence in an equal protection claim, Justice Brennan asserted, “It is 
unrealistic to expect either members of the judiciary or state officials to be 
well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical technique.”116 More 
 
 
 110. See Part II.B.  
 111. Brown, supra note 49, at 24 (quoting Vance explaining his adoption of analytics as follows: 
“The question I had when I came in was, Do we sit on our hands waiting for crime to tick up, or can we 
do something to drive crime lower?”).  
 112. Laurin, supra note 53, at 356 (explaining that one of the challenges of using analytics to 
evaluate indigent defense is the lack of agreement about “what good defense practice is aiming to 
achieve.”). 
 113. See infra Part III (identifying ways to expand analytics to serve defense interests).  
 114. While I focus on judicial competency, one cannot dismiss the possibility that judicial 
capacity—meaning the absolute number of cases the judiciary can process—is also a driver of this 
analytics imbalance. See Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 
122 YALE L.J. 422, 457 (2012) (arguing that “capacity constraints are a principal factor preventing courts 
from dealing competently with many important constitutional questions”).  
 115. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).  
 116. Id. at 204. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/5
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recently, the Court cautioned lower courts against intervening in technical 
controversies beyond their expertise.117 This reluctance is consistent with 
the Justices’ limited experience with technology.118  
The Court has also recognized the judiciary’s limited competency to 
evaluate certain aspects of prosecutorial discretion. For example, in Wayte 
v. U.S.,119 the defendant challenged the government’s passive enforcement 
policy for people who failed to register for the military draft.120 The Court 
ultimately upheld the charging policy, emphasizing the broad discretion 
prosecutors have to bring or decline criminal charges.121 In doing so, the 
Court emphasized its limitations. It explained that the Court’s deference to 
prosecutors “rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute 
is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.”122 It added that the factors that 
go into the charging decision “are not readily susceptible to the kind of 
analysis the courts are competent to undertake.”123 
This type of analysis, where the Court has asserted its limited 
competency, sends a strong signal to litigants about the utility of analytics 
as a litigation strategy. But this signal is not equally felt by law enforcement 
and prosecutors. Rather, the crime-fighting use of analytics happens largely 
outside of the reach of the Constitution, and, hence, outside of the reach of 
the judiciary.124 However, as a tool to serve defense interests, analytics 
would often be filtered through the courts.125 To the extent that courts are 
unwilling or unable to use analytics, the criminal justice system’s reliance 
on “guesswork” is preserved.126 In turn, this reluctance or inability to engage 
 
 
 117. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2740 (“[F]ederal courts should not ‘embroil 
[themselves] in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise.’” (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 
U.S. 35, 51 (2008))). See generally Mary Graw Leary, The Supreme Digital Divide, 48 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 65, 66 (2015) (arguing that the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is weakened by the 
digital “divide between the perspective of the Court and twenty-first century realities”).  
 118. See, e.g., Alan M. Trammell and Derek E. Bambauer, Personal Jurisdiction and the 
‘Interwebs’, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1151–52 (2015) (arguing that judges’ limited technological 
experience and understanding caused deficiencies in the jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction); 
Michelle R. Smith, Kagan: Court Hasn’t Really ‘Gotten to’ Email, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 20, 2013, 
9:53 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/kagan-justices-not-tech-savvy-send-paper-memos (quoting 
Justice Kagan saying, “The justices are not necessarily the most technologically sophisticated people . . 
. The court hasn’t really ‘gotten to’ email.”). 
 119. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).  
 120. Id. at 601 (explaining that the government’s passive enforcement policy focused 
disproportionately on people who wrote the Selective Service to inform it of their decision not to 
register).  
 121. Id. at 614.  
 122. Id. at 607.  
 123. Id. 
 124. See supra Part I.B.  
 125. See infra Part II.C. (making the case that analytics can improve judicial analysis).  
 126. See Kozinski, supra note 7. 
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with analytics makes it less likely that defendants and criminal justice 
reformers will use resources to build the data sets necessary to expand this 
tool.  
II. EXTENDING ANALYTICS TO THE PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTION 
This Part explains why part of the response to the uneven adoption of 
analytics should be to expand the use of analytics to areas that can benefit 
defendants. It offers more than a simplistic, “everybody’s doing it” 
argument. Rather, it makes the affirmative case that expanding the use of 
analytics can improve the prosecutorial function, increase community 
participation in the justice system, advance constitutional decision-making, 
and promote the systemic goals of justice and fairness.  
It is worth noting that addressing the analytics imbalance by expanding 
its use beyond crime-fighting interests is not the only option. Several 
scholars have advocated for restricting (or at least regulating) the state’s use 
of analytics in the crime-fighting sphere.127 Former Attorney General Eric 
Holder cautioned that predictive policing methods and risk-assessment 
driven sentencing decisions “should not be based on unchangeable factors 
that a person cannot control, or on the possibility of a future crime that has 
not taken place.”128 Others have questioned whether analytics shares the 
same promise as a tool for the defense as it does for law enforcement and 
prosecutors.  
This Article takes a different path. It proposes an expanded role for 
analytics, focusing on areas where analytics can be used to serve defense 
interests and help promote broader goals in justice and fairness. This Part 
explores why this expansion would be a positive development irrespective 
of the use of analytics to fight crime. It argues that analytics offers promise 
as a tool to: 1) regulate prosecutors’ expanding power; 2) more accurately 
measure prosecutorial performance; and 3) improve constitutional decision-
making.  
A. Checking Prosecutorial Power  
 
 
 127. See, e.g., Sidhu, supra note 50, (exploring arguments against using analytics to develop risk-
assessment tools for sentencing); Lapp, supra note 52, at 7 (discussing the pathology of “dataveillance”). 
Cf. Sunita Sah et al., Blinding Prosecutors to Defendants’ Race: A Policy Proposal to Reduce 
Unconscious Bias in the Criminal Justice System, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 69, 73 (2015) (warning that 
one of the potential drawbacks of blinding prosecutors to the race of defendants is that prosecutors may 
be less likely to express empathy for anonymized defendants).  
 128. Eric Holder, Attorney General, Address at the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyer’s 57th Annual Meeting (Aug. 1, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-national-association-criminal-defense-lawyers-57th).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/5
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The affirmative case for expanding the use of analytics starts with 
recognizing the extraordinary power of prosecutors. Society and 
prosecutors alike have long recognized the power of the institution.129 
Former Attorney General Robert Jackson acknowledged this over 75 years 
ago when he concluded, “The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, 
and reputation than any other person in America.”130 Jackson’s description 
is even more accurate today; the criminal justice system has evolved in a 
way that has consolidated more power and discretion in the prosecutor’s 
hands.131 Furthermore, the expansion of the prosecutor’s power has 
coincided with, and contributed to, the dramatic expansion of the criminal 
justice system in the last four decades.132  
Prosecutorial power has increased in absolute and comparative terms. 
Changes in substantive criminal law and sentencing regimes have provided 
prosecutors more power during the charging and plea bargaining process. 
Constitutional rulings have insulated many prosecutorial decisions from 
judicial review.133 And, simultaneously, other institutions in the criminal 
justice system have lost power. This Section summarizes these 
developments, setting the stage for how analytics can serve as a check on 
prosecutorial power.  
Two trends in how society classifies and defines criminal conduct have 
consolidated power in the prosecutor’s office. First, a dramatic increase in 
the number of criminal laws has expanded the universe of activity that can 
be classified as criminal.134 The addition of new criminal prohibitions has 
been so quick and cumbersome that it is difficult simply to count the number 
of criminal laws.135 This has given prosecutors the ability to pick from an 
 
 
 129. See, e.g., Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 AM. INST. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 (1940) (recognizing the prosecutor’s “tremendous” discretion in initiating 
investigations, bringing charges, and recommending sentences).  
 130. Id.  
 131. Bibas, supra note 23, at 960 (“No government official in America has as much unreviewable 
power and discretion as the prosecutor.”).  
 132. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 47 (2011) (“More 
inmates live in state and federal penitentiaries than in the past chiefly because prosecutors have charged 
and convicted more criminal defendants than in the past.”); id. at 299 (“In 1974, 17,000 local prosecutors 
were responsible for some 300,000 felony prosecutions each year. Thirty years later, the number of local 
prosecutors had grown to 27,000—but the annual number of felony prosecutions had exploded, topping 
1 million.”); John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1239 
(2012) (providing empirical evidence that modern incarceration rates are the result of prosecutors filing 
more cases as opposed to longer sentences or other factors).  
 133. See, e.g., Fagan supra note 72.  
 134. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, You’re (Probably) a Federal Criminal, IN THE 
NAME OF JUSTICE: LEADING EXPERTS REEXAMINING THE CLASSICAL ARTICLE “THE AIMS OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW” 43 (Timothy Lynch ed., 2009). 
 135. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Many Failed Efforts to Count Nation’s Federal Criminal 
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assortment of different crimes with different sentencing ranges on the front 
end of a case.  
Prosecutors have always had to choose which cases to pursue;136 
however, new and revised statutes have increased prosecutorial power by 
making it increasingly difficult for any of us to avoid overstepping criminal 
laws.137 In his unsparing critique of the modern criminal justice system, 
Judge Alex Kozinski demonstrated the long reach of prosecutorial power by 
describing a game federal prosecutors played in which they challenged each 
other to identify “plausible” criminal charges for well-known individuals 
picked at random.138 The fact that the challenge was realistic demonstrates 
the vast reach of our criminal laws. 
The sheer number of criminal laws tells only part of the story. Changes 
in how legislatures define criminal conduct has also expanded the power of 
prosecutors. For example, while it was once routine to require proof that a 
defendant acted with a morally blameworthy state of mind, the modern trend 
is to minimize, or sometimes eliminate altogether,139 this requirement.140 
For example, “In today’s courtroom . . . defendants are prosecuted not just 
for breaking and entering, but for simply possessing burglary tools as 
well.”141  
Changes in sentencing practices have also increased prosecutors’ power. 
 
 
Laws, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230431980457 
6389601079728920 (reporting that a 1982 attempt by the Justice Department to count the number of 
federal crimes was only successful at coming up with an “educated estimate” of about 3,000 federal 
criminal offenses and a similar effort by the ABA in 1998 concluded that attempting to count the number 
of federal crimes was “futile” and would nonetheless end up with an inaccurate tally). See generally 
John S. Baker, Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, LEGAL 
MEMORANDUM No. 26, June 2008, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/06/ revisiting-the-
explosive-growth-of-federal-crimes (finding that between 1980 and 2007 over 50 new federal crimes 
were added each year); Jeff Welty, Overcriminalization in North Carolina, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1935 (2014) 
(analyzing the expansion of North Carolina’s criminal code). 
 136. Jackson, supra note 129, at 5 (“One of the greatest difficulties of the position of prosecutor is 
that he must pick his cases, because no prosecutor can even investigate all of the cases in which he 
receives complaints. If the Department of Justice were to make even a pretense of reaching every 
provable violation of federal law, ten times its present staff would be inadequate.”).  
 137. Pathological Politics, supra note 89, at 509 (“As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and 
adjudication pass into the hands of police and prosecutors; law enforcers, not the law, determine who 
goes to prison and for how long.”).  
 138. Kozinski, supra note 7, at xliv (quoting Tim Wu, American Lawbreaking, SLATE (Oct. 14, 
2007), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/features/2007/american_law 
breaking/introduction.html.). 
 139. For an argument that strict liability crimes can lead to unfair results, see Elizabeth Nevins-
Saunders, Incomprehensible Crimes: Defendants With Mental Retardation Charged With Statutory 
Rape, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067 (2010).  
 140. See STUNTZ, supra note 132, at 260 (“Traditionally, that body of law required proof that the 
defendant acted with a state of mind that was worthy of moral blame. . . . But for the most part, the 
concept of wrongful intent . . . has gone by the boards.”).  
 141. See Roth, supra note 48, at 1264.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/5
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Increased reliance on mandatory minimums, sentencing guidelines, 
formalized risk-assessment tools, and so-called evidence-based sentencing 
schemes have simultaneously expanded the power of the prosecutors and 
limited the role of the judiciary in sentencing decisions. Prosecutors set the 
terms of potential sentences with their charging decisions in a variety of 
ways, such as by stacking charges that result from a single course of 
conduct.142 And even after setting the initial charge, they control the process 
by exercising their power to bargain away charges or to agree to hide factors 
from the court that would affect sentencing.  
The prosecutor has also gained leverage and power as the collateral 
consequences of arrests and convictions have expanded.143 These collateral 
consequences can include restrictions on individual liberty, including 
continued confinement, even after a convicted offender serves his entire 
criminal sentence.144 Other, less drastic liberty restrictions follow convicted 
individuals in less obvious ways.145 When paired with the prosecutor’s 
power to initiate criminal charges and negotiate plea bargains, the expansion 
of deep collateral consequences gives the prosecutor one more lever of 
power in a system that had already granted prosecutors immense power.  
Finally, the increased power of the prosecutor is closely tied to law 
enforcement’s expanding power as a result of new surveillance techniques 
that help police identify a larger percentage of ongoing criminal activity.146 
The more cases law enforcement brings to the prosecutor, the more the 
prosecutor is able exercise her discretion.  
While prosecutorial power has increased, prosecutors face 
comparatively little regulation and oversight.147 Where applicable, 
 
 
 142. See STUNTZ, supra note 89, at 296 (concluding that in the modern criminal justice system 
“[i]nstead of juries and trial judges deciding whether this or that defendant merits punishing, prosecutors 
decide who deserves a trip to the nearest penitentiary”).  
 143. See ALEXANDER, supra note 52, at 2 (“Once you’re labeled a felon, the old forms of 
discrimination—employment discrimination, housing discrimination, denial of the right to vote, denial 
of educational opportunity, denial of food stamps and other public benefits, and exclusion from jury 
service—are suddenly legal.”).  
 144. See NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS 
(2012) http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Sex%20Offender%20Civil%20Commitment-April% 202012.pdf 
(compiling state laws that provide for civil commitment of sex offenders following their criminal 
sentences). 
 145. See generally, American Bar Association, National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences 
of Conviction, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/ (compiling collateral consequences by 
jurisdiction).  
 146. For example, in prior work, I explored how the growth of local DNA databases has allowed 
police to more effectively solve high-volume property crimes. See Kreag, supra note 60. 
 147. See Bibas, supra note 23, at 960 (“No government official in America has as much 
unreviewable power and discretion as the prosecutor.”); id. at 962 (“Many, if not most, other government 
actors enjoy less power yet are subject to far more regulation than prosecutors are. The comparison 
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constitutional protections provide only floors. This leaves many 
prosecutorial decisions, including decisions like charging, nearly untouched 
by constitutional review.148  
Other areas of constitutional criminal procedure also leave prosecutors 
with a great amount of unregulated power. For example, despite the 
system’s overwhelming reliance on guilty pleas and plea bargaining,149 the 
Court has been unwilling to extend key due process protections to plea 
bargaining. Specifically, while the Due Process Clause requires prosecutors 
to disclose material exculpatory and impeachment information to the 
defense in advance of trial,150 the Court has remained silent about the extent 
to which this right applies during plea negotiations.151 The Court’s silence 
leaves this important issue152 to be determined by lower federal courts, state 
courts, and the ethical rules that guide prosecutors.153  
In an address at the University of Arizona College of Law, former United 
States Attorney for the District of Arizona, Paul Charlton, explained how 
his office applied Brady during plea negotiations when he was the United 
States Attorney.154 Charlton stated that, while he generally favored 
expanded pretrial discovery for criminal defendants, prosecutors had the 
authority to determine when Brady’s full due process protections applied in 
guilty plea cases. For example, he argued that in “fast track” illegal reentry 
immigration cases it was ethical and constitutional for federal prosecutors 
to refuse to provide pretrial discovery. Charlton added that if a defendant 
wanted to receive full discovery, he had to forgo the “fast track” proceedings 
and go to trial. He recognized that defendants who elected to exercise their 
 
 
suggests that prosecutors are the outliers and that some new regulatory mechanisms are likely to be 
worth the cost.”).  
 148. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal justice system, the 
Government retains broad discretion as to whom to prosecute. So long as the prosecutor has probable 
cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not 
to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his 
discretion.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
 149. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (recognizing that “criminal justice today is 
for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials”).  
 150. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 
(1972) (extending Brady to impeachment material).  
 151. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) (holding that due process does not require 
the prosecutor to disclose material impeachment evidence during plea negotiations, but remaining silent 
with respect to other forms of exculpatory evidence).  
 152. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (“When the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be 
determinative of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [Brady’s 
reach].” (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959))).  
 153. See, e.g., Buffey v. Ballard, 782 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 2015) (extending Brady to plea 
negotiations).  
 154. Paul Charlton, Address to the University of Arizona College of Law Program in Criminal Law 
and Policy: Prosecutorial Ethics (Oct. 22, 2015) (notes on file with author).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/5
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right to go to trial and obtain full discovery likely faced more serious 
punishment upon being found guilty at trial, but he found this bargain 
permissible and within the prosecutor’s discretion.155  
Minimal constitutional regulation of prosecutorial decision-making is 
paired with equally slight regulation and oversight from political forces. 
This does not mean that prosecutors are not political actors. They are, and 
political calculations certainly check their discretion.156 However, relying 
on political forces to regulate prosecutorial decision-making is a weak form 
of regulation.157  
B. Moving Beyond Conviction Rates 
The fact that analytics has not been used to evaluate the prosecutorial 
function cannot be explained by prosecutorial resistance to being 
measured.158 Prosecutors are accustomed to having their ultimate results 
measured. They accept, and sometimes welcome, the fact that conviction 
rates are used to evaluate performance.159 However, the focus on conviction 
rates is insufficient to effectively analyze prosecutorial decision-making and 
to incorporate defense interests and broader interests in fairness and 
justice.160 This traditional metric leaves relevant information unexamined, 
 
 
 155. Id.  
 156. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 129 at 3 (pointing to the requirement of a presidential 
appointment and the Senate confirmation process as political checks to evaluate the “character” of 
prosecutors in the federal system); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 728 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Under our system of government, the primary check against prosecutorial abuse is a political one.”).  
 157. The infrequency with which prosecutors face any negative consequences even when they are 
found to have committed misconduct or abused their offices supports the proposition that relying on 
political forces to regulate prosecutors is insufficient. See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 7, at xxxii (“In my 
experience, the U.S. Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) seems to view 
its mission as cleaning up the reputation of prosecutors who have gotten themselves into trouble.”); 
Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 275, 276 (2007); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 
1544–47 (2010) (summarizing studies documenting that prosecutors who commit misconduct are rarely 
punished).  
 158. Interestingly, the same may not be said for defense attorneys. See Laurin, supra note 53, at 360 
(“Professional opposition to data collection might also flow simply from what is widely understood to 
be an autonomous, maverick culture to criminal defense, one in which tracking hours spent and tasks 
performed is likely to be met with resistance.”); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984) 
(“No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety 
of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to 
represent a criminal defendant.”).  
 159. See, e.g., Jessica Fender, DA Chambers Offers Bonuses for Prosecutors Who Hit Conviction 
Targets, DENVER POST (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.denverpost.com/2011/03/23/da-chambers-offers-
bonuses-for-prosecutors-who-hit-conviction-targets/. 
 160. Cf. Kreag, supra note 60, at 1541 (“Solving and deterring crimes is how law enforcement 
defines its success, and it is often under considerable pressure to do these two things. In such an 
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fails to capture the full implications of prosecutorial discretion, is too easily 
manipulated, and is comparatively less helpful in our modern, plea 
dominated criminal justice system.  
The focus on conviction rates leaves important information uncollected 
and, therefore, unaccounted for. Conviction rates fail to measure where 
prosecutors exercise their most discretion—at the charging and plea 
bargaining stage at the beginning of a case.161 They are nearly useless for 
evaluating decisions to decline prosecution.162 They do not distinguish 
between convictions based on trials as opposed to guilty pleas. They are 
incapable for evaluating the coercive nature of plea bargains. They say 
nothing about jury selection or whether prosecutors meet their constitutional 
disclosure obligations. In short, by focusing on the ultimate result, they miss 
the process.  
In the marketing context, the continued focus on conviction rates is 
similar to a company tracking only the number of items sold. In the sports 
world, the focus on conviction rates is similar to focusing on the win-loss 
record. Such measures are helpful, but incomplete. The company could 
make better decisions if it also knew what type of consumers purchased its 
products, what products these consumers simultaneously purchased, and 
what type of marketing influenced their purchasing decisions. The sports 
team would benefit from measuring the discrete factors that contributed to 
the wins and losses.  
Conviction rates are also ineffective because they can easily be 
manipulated.163 Prosecutors can elect not to bring tough cases. Or, they can 
avoid tough cases by offering favorable pleas to defendants in exchange for 
dismissing certain charges. There are sound strategic reasons to do this in 
many cases. For example, a prosecutor may offer a generous plea in 
consultation with victims who do not want to go through the stress and pain 
of a public trial. But, most of us would agree that making such decisions to 
artificially maintain high conviction rates is not an appropriate use of 
discretion.  
 
 
environment, it is unlikely that law enforcement will identify and internalize all of the costs of a 
surveillance procedure, particularly when it believes that procedure to be effective at solving crime.”).  
 161. See generally Miller & Wright, supra note 92 (exploring the factors that influence declination 
decisions).  
 162. See id. (documenting how the former New Orleans District Attorney used analytics to evaluate 
declinations); Bibas, supra note 23, at 986–87 (concluding that conviction rates “are mediocre proxies 
for an office’s performance” and that they “ignore other important outcomes, such as declinations, 
sentences, and victim satisfaction”).  
 163. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 911, 935 (2006) (“District attorneys can create the misleading impression of toughness by touting 
99.5% conviction rates, when in fact most of those convictions come from lenient pleas.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/5
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The focus on conviction rates also masks the distributional effects of 
prosecutorial decision-making.164 Conviction rates provide little 
information about the extent to which the multitude of discretionary steps 
that precede a conviction are affected by or correlated with the experience 
level of the prosecutor and defense attorney, the race and gender of the 
prosecutor and defendant, or the offense of arrest, for example.165 Such 
information is only available with a much finer measure than the blunt focus 
of conviction rates.  
Finally, the continued focus on conviction rates fails to account for the 
fact that the modern criminal justice system is less dependent on trials as a 
means to determine guilt.166 “[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a 
system of pleas, not a system of trials.”167 The dependence on pleas modifies 
the adversarial nature of the criminal justice system, replacing it with 
administrative-like proceedings.168 In this administrative system, the 
conviction is nearly a forgone conclusion once charges are filed. The work 
is done in the private negotiations that set the terms for the conviction.169 
Evaluating prosecutorial performance by focusing on conviction rates fails 
to consider this reality.  
Part III provides several examples of how analytics can be used to 
measure prosecutorial decision-making. These examples are akin to moving 
beyond simply measuring wins and losses—convictions and not-guilty 
verdicts—and instead analyzing the determinable factors that contribute to 
the win-loss record. But before moving there, the next Section explains how 
analytics can also improve constitutional decision-making, which can, in 
turn, help make prosecutorial decisions more transparent.   
 
 
 164. Similarly, a focus on arrest rates masks the distributional effects of policing. See Harmon, 
supra note 93, at 811–812 (“[H]arms of policing are unevenly distributed. . . . African Americans and 
Latinos are much more often stopped, searched, arrested, and hurt by the police than are others.”); see 
also William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265 
(1999).  
 165. See, e.g., Kutateladze, supra note 30 (exploring disparate racial impacts of discretionary 
prosecutorial decisions in the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office).  
 166. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal 
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”). 
 167. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).  
 168. See generally STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012) (noting 
insiders – prosecution and defense attorneys – colluding).  
 169. See Richard A. Oppel Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/us/tough-sentences-help-prosecutors-push-for-
plea-bargains.html?_r=1 (quoting Federal Judge John J. Kane Jr. as follows: “How many times is a 
mandatory sentence used as a chip in order to coerce a plea? They don’t keep records . . . . That’s what 
the public doesn’t see . . . .”).  
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C. Improving Constitutional Decision-Making With Analytics 
When Judge Kozinski began his stinging critique of the criminal justice 
system by warning that “much of what we do in the law is guesswork,”170 
he joined a long list of scholars and commentators who have lamented the 
lack of an empirical foundation for many of the decisions made in the course 
of a criminal case.171 Kozinski offered a broad indictment of the system. 
This Section focuses on a part of the criticism, namely the guesswork and 
lack of empirical foundation that is prevalent in constitutional criminal 
procedure, particularly where it relates to regulating prosecutorial 
behavior.172 It uses the Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis in 
McCleskey and the due process analysis the Supreme Court has used to set 
the constitutional floor for pre-plea disclosure obligations to demonstrate 
that analytics can replace the guesswork and improve the Court’s ability to 
regulate prosecutorial decision-making.  
In time, some of the improvement will flow naturally from technological 
advancements that make it possible to collect and sort large data sets. 
Simply having the data will address part of the concerns courts have raised 
as an explanation for resisting the incorporation of analytics in 
constitutional rulings. Here, it is helpful to consider how courts analyzed 
the statistical evidence in McCleskey. The Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals and the Supreme Court assumed the validity of the statistical 
evidence.173 However, the district court was extremely critical of the 
study.174 It highlighted gaps in the data, critiqued the methodology, and 
ultimately concluded that it was not sufficiently trustworthy.175 Much of the 
district court’s concern was over McCleskey’s attempt to make predictions 
about the whole system by reviewing only a portion of it. Regardless of 
whether one believes this concern can be adequately overcome using 
 
 
 170. Kozinski, supra note 7, at iii. 
 171. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares and Bernard E. Harcourt, Supreme Court Review – Forward: 
Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 735 (2000) (“[U]se of empirical evidence will produce a clearer picture 
of the existing constitutional landscape and spotlight the normative judgments at the heart of criminal 
procedure cases.”) (emphasis omitted). But see Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. 
REV. 59, 77 (2013) (noting that Supreme Court opinions have a “new emphasis on factual claims 
reinforced by empirical data and secondary authorities”).  
 172. See, e.g., Oppel, supra note 169. Cf. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (concluding that raw 
video from the case provided clear evidence that police did not use excessive force despite the lack of 
empirical evidence to support this assertion); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to 
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009) 
(demonstrating empirically the limitations of the Court’s assertion of what the video proved).  
 173. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.7 (1987).  
 174. Id. at 287–89.  
 175. Id. at 288–89 n.6. 
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statistical sampling methods, the modern reality of ever-growing data 
collection can minimize, and perhaps erase, this concern.  
Prof. Elizabeth E. Joh explored this new reality in discussing how 
analytics and big data are changing policing:  
If conventional scientific research begins with a hypothesis or 
question that then shapes the collection of the relevant data, the big 
data phenomenon turns such conventions upside down. Because data 
is being collected and stored all of the time, research questions do not 
have to shape or limit data collection at all. Researchers need not limit 
themselves to data sampling, either. Big data permits the study of a 
phenomenon where the set is nearly everything that is possible to 
study (another way of stating that we are approaching n=all).176 
The promise of analytics in a world where everything is measured is far 
from a reality, particularly in the criminal justice system.177 One of the 
central goals of this Article is to promote measuring and data collection 
about prosecutorial decision-making to the same degree that we do in other 
areas. When we do, it is possible to imagine that concerns about sampling 
and data gaps will fall away.178  
Notably, the principles of analytics can improve the Court’s 
constitutional analysis of prosecutorial decision-making even before we 
reach n=all, in Joh’s terms. In United States v. Ruiz,179 the Court held that 
the Due Process Clause does not require prosecutors to disclose “material 
impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement.”180 The Court’s 
analysis of this weighty constitutional issue with far-reaching implications 
was remarkable for several reasons. But what is most obvious when viewing 
the opinion with an eye to how analytics can improve constitutional 
decision-making is the near total lack of empirical foundation for the 
Court’s reasoning. This void is particularly stunning because the Court 
rested its holding on a traditional due process balancing test, weighing the 
nature and value of the private interest (here, the defendant’s interest in pre-
plea disclosure of impeachment evidence) against the burden imposed on 
 
 
 176. See Joh, supra note 36, at 40 (citing VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG 
DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 26 (2013). 
 177. See Wright & Peeples, supra note 53, at 1224 (2013) (characterizing the criminal justice system 
as a “data-poor environment”).  
 178. Of course, this only addresses one of the hurdles of McCleskey. The Supreme Court assumed 
the validity of McCleskey’s statistical evidence. 481 U.S. at 291 n. 7. Nonetheless, it denied his claim, 
finding that the evidence, even if true, could not independently establish purposeful discrimination. Id. 
at 291. 
 179. 536 U.S. 622 (2002).  
 180. Id. at 633.  
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the government.181 One would expect that by setting up the test this way the 
Court would at least attempt to identify the actual (or even approximate) 
private benefits and government burdens. It did not. Rather, the Court 
offered evidence-free assertions, downplaying the private benefit and 
overstating the government interest.  
With respect to the private benefit, the Court first narrowly defined the 
interest at stake, focusing only on whether “in the absence of impeachment 
information, innocent individuals, accused of crimes, will plead guilty.”182 
But the Due Process Clause protects more than innocence.183 It also seeks 
to ensure fair play and fair proceedings,184 factors the Court neglected to 
consider. The Court’s evidence-free analysis continued when it concluded 
that the concern that innocent people would plead guilty if prosecutors did 
not disclose impeachment evidence was “diminished” by the government’s 
agreement in Ruiz’s case to disclose “any information establishing . . . 
factual innocence.”185 Plainly, this is a logical conclusion. However, the 
Court did not even attempt to quantify how much the risk is diminished. It 
simply asserted that the decreased risk is a “comparatively small . . . 
constitutional benefit.”186 
If the Court was concerned with providing an empirically justified due 
process analysis it should have, at a minimum, recognized the deficiency in 
its analysis. What is more, even in 2002, there was ample evidence of false 
confessions and defendants pleading guilty despite their innocence.187 
Furthermore, the hypothetical innocent defendant that the Court used in its 
analysis is concerned with more than receiving “any information 
establishing . . . factual innocence.”188 This innocent defendant 
contemplating pleading guilty might elect to go to trial if he knew that the 
government possessed information that tended to support his innocence or 
even evidence that had the potential to undermine key aspects of the state’s 
case.189 Even if we accept the fact that the Court did not possess enough 
 
 
 181. Id. at 631.  
 182. Id.  
 183. See Kreag, supra note 39, at 832 (discussing the twin aims of due process—protecting 
innocence and ensuring fair proceedings).  
 184. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“Society wins not only when the guilty 
are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when 
any accused is treated unfairly.”); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“It is as much [the 
prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it 
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”). 
 185. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631.  
 186. Id. at 632.  
 187. See The Cases, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases.  
 188. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631. 
 189. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (“The jury’s estimate of the truthfulness 
and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence[.]”).  
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information to predict at what rate innocent defendants would make this 
decision, the Court’s failure to acknowledge it undermines its holding.  
On the government’s side of the ledger, the Court did not even attempt 
to hide the fact that its holding was based on speculation as opposed to 
empirical measures. It simply listed several potential burdens the 
government might face if it was required to disclose impeachment evidence 
pre-plea.190 And it did not even offer a guess about the likelihood that the 
government would actually face these burdens. Instead, it summarily 
concluded that that these potential burdens would amount to a “radical . . . 
change in the criminal justice process.”191  
Ruiz is more than small-data constitutional analysis. It is no-data 
constitutional analysis. Its analysis, and perhaps its outcome, would have 
been different had the Court had access to reliable data. The relevant data 
would include, among other things, whether guilty plea rates are different 
in jurisdictions where prosecutors routinely provide full disclosures pre-
plea in addition to pre-trial. This data would help to more accurately weigh 
the private benefit of extending Brady’s full protections to pre-trial 
proceedings. The data would also include a more fine-grained assessment 
of the costs to prosecutors to provide full disclosure in guilty plea cases. 
Here, again, the Court’s analysis would have been bolstered by reviewing 
the actual costs prosecutors face in jurisdictions with open file policies. The 
mere fact that some prosecuting agencies elect to open their files in part 
demonstrates that the costs of extending full due process disclosure 
protections to plea bargaining is manageable.  
Beyond the Supreme Court, the adoption of analytics could change 
constitutional criminal procedure in other ways. The Court’s constitutional 
decisions often leave important questions for lower courts. Because the 
lower courts make decisions constrained by the same data-poor 
environment that the Court faces, these courts often make decisions based 
on little or no empirical foundation. Not surprisingly, the lack of empirical 
foundation contributes to lower courts issuing inconsistent constitutional 
rulings. Undoubtedly, some of the inconsistency would remain even in a 
world where courts had full information. However, there is reason to believe 
that empirically-based constitutional analysis would increase uniformity of 
judgments.   
 
 
 190. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631–32 (repeatedly identifying burdens that “could” come to pass if the 
government must disclose impeachment evidence).  
 191. Id. at 632.  
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III. ANALYTICS BEYOND CRIME-FIGHTING 
This Part identifies four applications of analytics that would serve 
defense interests and broader interests in justice, fairness, and transparency. 
Remedying the analytics imbalance in the criminal justice system will 
require work beyond these four areas. Nonetheless, I offer them as a 
jumping off point from which others will identify additional applications of 
analytics to evaluate and improve the prosecutorial function.  
A. Jury Selection 
Analytics is rapidly changing jury selection.192 Vast databases, 
predictive tools, and real-time processing have helped litigants predict 
which jurors will be favorable toward or skeptical of their claims.193 
However, the Constitution forbids litigants from making these decisions 
based on race.194 Despite this prohibition, racial discrimination in jury 
selection remains a significant stain on the criminal justice system.195 
Analytics can help remove this stain.196  
Batson adopted a three-part test to determine if a prosecutor’s 
peremptory strikes violate equal protection.197 At step one the defendant 
must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination.198 Step two 
requires that the prosecutor offer race-neutral reasons for each challenged 
strike.199 And at step three the court evaluates the veracity of the 
 
 
 192. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Big Data Jury, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 935 (2016); 
Caren Myers Morrison, Investigating Jurors on Social Media, 35 PACE L. REV. 285 (2014).  
 193. See Ferguson, supra note 192.  
 194. See Batson v. Kentucky, 467 U.S. 79 (1986); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 
(1994) (extending Batson to sex).  
 195. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 238 (2005) (“[T]he very integrity of the courts is 
jeopardized when a prosecutor’s discrimination ‘invites cynicism respecting the jury’s neutrality’ and 
undermines public confidence in adjudication.”) (citation omitted); Id. at 268 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(listing studies documenting the prevalence of race-based jury selection practices).  
 196. An alternative to analytics is prohibiting peremptory strikes. Batson, 467 U.S. at 102–03 
(Marshall, J. concurring) (“The decision today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories 
inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory 
challenges entirely.”); Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially 
Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099 (1994).  
 197. Because this Article is focused on using analytics to evaluate prosecutorial decision-making, 
this Section focuses on prosecutorial efforts to exclude black jurors. Batson, however, extends to defense 
strikes as well. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992). Batson also extends to civil litigants. See 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). But the Court has not extended Batson to 
discrimination based on religion. See Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994) (denying certiorari).  
 198. Snyder v. La., 552 U.S. 472, 476 (2008) (“First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing 
that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race . . . .”).  
 199. Id. at 477 (requiring that “the prosecution . . . offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in 
question”).  
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prosecutor’s purported race-neutral reasons.200 In doing so, the court must 
consider “all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial 
animosity”201 to determine if the defendant proved purposeful 
discrimination.202 The analysis at step three is the heart of Batson. The Court 
set a low bar for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination at step 
one.203 And, in practice, step two is a formality.204 
The Court instructs judges to perform the lie-detecting function at 
Batson’s step three by measuring “how reasonable, or how improbable, the 
[prosecutor’s race neutral] explanations are; and by whether the proffered 
rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.”205 But the Court 
provides little guidance about how to measure this, admitting that, in 
contrast with the record in Tim Foster’s case, judges often must evaluate the 
prosecutor’s veracity without access to the direct evidence.206 The Court 
attempts to fill this void by instructing judges that “the best evidence [of 
discriminatory intent] often will be the demeanor of the [prosecutor].”207  
By focusing on a trial court’s evaluation of the prosecutor’s demeanor,208 
Batson rejects a more reliable and objective tool available to help judges 
 
 
 200. Id. (“[T]hird, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the 
defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.”); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 
(2003) (“In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s 
race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.” (quoting Hernandez v. New 
York, 500 U.S. 362, 365 (1991))).  
 201. 552 U.S. at 478. 
 202. Id. at 477.  
 203. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005) (“We did not intend the first step to 
be so onerous that a defendant would have to persuade the judge—on the basis of all the facts, some of 
which are impossible for the defendant to know with certainty—that the challenge was more likely than 
not the product of purposeful discrimination. Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s 
first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that 
discrimination has occurred.”).  
 204. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More Than 
the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1093 
(2011) (“[P]rosecutors regularly respond to a defendant’s prima facie case of racially motivated jury 
selection with tepid, almost laughable ‘race-neutral’ reasons, as well as purportedly ‘race-neutral’ 
reasons that strongly correlate with race. More significantly, . . . courts accept those reasons . . . and 
almost without exception, those reasons survive subsequent scrutiny . . . .”).  
 205. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339. 
 206. Of course, circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to prove a Batson claim. See Batson v. 
Kentucky, 472 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (recognizing that in evaluating whether a defendant has proven 
purposeful discrimination, a “court must undertake a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct 
evidence of intent as may be available”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 
U.S. 231, 246 (2005) (“[T]he State’s failure to engage in any meaningful voir dire examination on a 
subject the State alleges it is concerned about is evidence suggesting that the explanation is a sham and 
a pretext for discrimination.” (quoting Ex parte Travis, 776 So. 2d 874, 881 (Ala. 2000))). 
 207. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
 208. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008) (citing Hernandez for the proposition that 
the court must evaluate “whether the prosecutor’s demeanor belies a discriminatory intent.”).  
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evaluate the presence of discriminatory intent.209 Rather than focusing on 
an imprecise evaluation of the prosecutor’s demeanor, courts should use 
analytics to determine if the prosecution’s peremptory strikes are the result 
of purposeful discrimination. This Section identifies two ways to do this. 
The first focuses only on the jury selection data within a given case. This is 
an example of a small data approach to constitutional criminal procedure.210 
The second requires collecting and analyzing historical jury strike data.  
The Court’s demeanor-focused step three analysis should be 
supplemented with statistical analysis. Notably, in many cases, such 
analysis is possible even when limiting the analysis to the strike patterns 
within a given case. Here, the relevant statistical question is whether the 
number of black jurors excluded by the prosecutor in a given case is 
statistically significantly larger than the number of black jurors that we 
expect would be excluded if the prosecutor exercised her peremptory 
challenges randomly.211 Stated another way, the question is, how likely is it 
that if the prosecutor exercised her jury strikes randomly the number of 
black jurors struck would equal or exceed the number of black jurors the 
prosecutor actually struck? The answer to these questions will not 
conclusively determine whether a prosecutor’s strikes were the result of 
purposeful discrimination. However, just as a prosecutor’s pattern of 
questions during void dire is relevant to Batson’s step three,212 this statistical 
information can help judges identify purposeful discrimination.  
Professor and statistician Joseph L. Gastwirth has explored the 
usefulness of statistical analysis to identify the presence of purposeful 
discrimination in jury selection in a series of papers.213 Most recently, he 
 
 
 209. Notably, the Court admits that the current Batson framework is often not up to the task of 
curbing racial discrimination. See, e.g., Dretke, 545 U.S. at 238 (“The rub has been the practical 
difficulty of ferreting out discrimination in selections discretionary by nature, and choices subject to 
myriad legitimate influences, whatever the race of the individuals on the panel from which jurors are 
selected.”); id. at 267 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The complexity of this process reflects the difficulty of 
finding a legal test that will objectively measure the inherently subjective reasons that underlie use of a 
peremptory challenge.”); id. at 267–68 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Batson asks judges to engage in the 
awkward, sometime hopeless, task of second-guessing a prosecutor’s instinctive judgment—the 
underlying basis for which may be invisible even to the prosecutor exercising the challenge.”).  
 210. See supra Part I.B. 
 211. Fisher’s exact test is one statistical test that can be used to answer this question. See MICHAEL 
O. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 123–25; 154–56 (2001) (describing 
Fisher’s exact test).  
 212. See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 246 (“[T]he State’s failure to engage in any meaningful voir dire 
examination on a subject the State alleges it is concerned about is evidence suggesting that the 
explanation is a sham and a pretext for discrimination.”) (quoting Ex parte Travis, 776 So. 2d 874, 881 
(Ala. 2000)). 
 213. See, e.g., Joseph L. Gastwirth, Statistical Testing of Peremptory Challenge Data for Possible 
Discrimination: Application to Foster v. Chatman, 69 VAND. L. REV. En Banc 51 (2016) [hereinafter 
“Statistical Testing”]; Joseph L. Gastwirth et al., Case Comment: Appropriate Statistical Methodology 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/5
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demonstrated that one statistical tool, the Fisher’s exact test, has accurately 
predicted the outcome in several Batson cases that reached the Supreme 
Court.214 Most recently, the test accurately predicted the Court’s finding of 
purposeful discrimination in Tim Foster’s case.215  
Analytics can also be used to uncover purposeful discrimination by 
incorporating jury strike data from other cases. For example, a prosecutor’s 
or a prosecutorial office’s history of peremptory strikes are relevant at 
Batson’s step three, and analytics offers a method to incorporate this data. 
Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine the Batson equivalent of law 
enforcement’s heat lists that are designed to identify potential future 
offenders.216  
In the law enforcement context, these so-called heat lists are created by 
analyzing inputs in addition to past criminal behavior. For example, they 
incorporate analysis of social networks, based on the theory that if one’s 
associates are engaged in criminal activity or the victims of criminal 
activity, it is more likely that an individual will be involved in violent crime. 
Similarly, in the Batson context, data wholly outside of the jury selection 
process might also prove helpful in uncovering purposeful discrimination in 
jury selection.217 For example, a prosecutor’s past public comments may 
demonstrate a lack of sensitivity to racial discrimination or overt bigotry.218 
Or, a record that other prosecutorial decisions have contributed to racially 
disparate outcomes might warrant a more careful attention to jury selection 
patterns in a given case.219 Finally, because Batson’s step three turns on the 
prosecutor’s veracity, past conduct that demonstrated a willingness to be 
 
 
Yields Stronger Evidence of Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges in North Carolina: Application to 
the Randolph County Data in North Carolina v. Rouse and Related Cases, 12 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 
155 (2013); Joseph L. Gastwirth et al., Case Comment: Statistical Tests for the Analysis of Data on 
Peremptory Challenges: Clarifying the Standard of Proof Needed to Establish a Prima Facie Case of 
Discrimination in Johnson v. California, 4 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 179 (2005). 
 214. See Statistical Testing, supra note 213, at 93–95 (demonstrating that the Fisher’s exact test 
accurately predicted results in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B. 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Snyder v. Louisiana, 
552 U.S. 472 (2008); and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
 215. Statistical Testing, supra note 213, at 85–88; Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).  
 216. See Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Police Use ‘Heat List’ as Strategy to Prevent Violence, CHI. TRIB. 
(Aug. 21, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-21/news/ct-met-heat-list-
20130821_1_chicago-police-commander-andrew-papachristos-heat-list.  
 217. Cf. Amersterdam, supra note 64, at 49–51 (describing a similar comprehensive, data-centered 
approach to overcome “McCleskey’s requirement of proof of subjective racial animus”).  
 218. See, e.g., Calhoun v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1136, 1136 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.) (criticizing 
the prosecutor’s race-based argument: “You’ve got African-Americans, you’ve got Hispanics, you’ve 
got a bag full of money. Does that tell you—a light bulb doesn’t go off in your head and say, This is a 
drug deal?”).  
 219. See, e.g., Kutateladze, supra note 30 (documenting the results of Vera’s multi-year study of 
the New York County District Attorney’s Office).  
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less than candid in court is also relevant and could be incorporated in 
creating a Batson-type heat list.  
Notably, there is support in the Court’s case law for the use of analytics 
to identify purposeful discrimination. This support covers both the use of 
analytics to focus solely within a given case and by incorporating historical 
patterns. For example, in finding the Batson violation in Miller-El v. Dretke, 
the Court concluded that “[h]appenstance [was] unlikely to produce” the 
racial disparity in the prosecutor’s jury strikes.220 The Court’s analysis 
invites the use of statistical tests like the Fisher’s exact test to compare the 
racial breakdown of the actual jury strikes in a case to the expected outcome 
if the strikes were performed at random.  
Furthermore, when Miller-El’s Batson claim first reached the Court, the 
Court made clear that historical jury strike patterns and even the culture of 
the prosecutor’s office are relevant to Batson’s step three.221 In addition, 
past strikes that were close but ultimately not found to be the result of 
purposeful discrimination are also relevant at step three.222 Here, using prior 
Batson close calls and the “culture” of a prosecutor’s office to help identify 
purposeful discrimination is the equivalent of using prior arrests that did not 
result in convictions and social networks to help law enforcement create 
heat lists composed of likely future offenders. Of course, social networks 
and past criminal conduct or arrests cannot perfectly predict future criminal 
activity. Regardless, the failure to use available analytical tools to include 
this type of information in Batson’s step three undoubtedly leaves some 
instances of purposeful discrimination hidden.  
Ironically, the use of analytics in this context is a nod to the pre-Batson 
equal protection standard in Swain v. Alabama.223 In Swain, the prosecutor 
struck all 6 eligible black jurors.224 Furthermore, Swain demonstrated that 
for at least the decade before his case reached the Court, 100 percent of the 
eligible black jurors were excluded from every petit jury, civil or criminal, 
in Talladega, Alabama.225 Despite this evidence, the Court rejected Swain’s 
 
 
 220. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 
342 (2003)).  
 221. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 347 (recognizing that the step three determination about whether the 
prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons are credible can take into account “the culture of the District Attorney’s 
Office”); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (requiring courts to consider “all relevant 
circumstances” at Batson’s step three).  
 222. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (“[I]f there were persisting doubts as to the 
outcome, a court would be required to consider the strike of Ms. Scott for the bearing it might have upon 
the strike of Mr. Brooks.”). 
 223. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).  
 224. Id. at 205. 
 225. Id. at 226.  
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equal protection claim.226 The Court held that Swain failed to prove that 
prosecution jury selection practices, not those of defense attorneys, were 
responsible for the total exclusion of black jurors in Talladega.227  
The rule the Court adopted in Swain required defendants to prove 
systemic discrimination against black jurors “over a period of time.”228 This 
was a big data, analytics-based constitutional rule. But because it was 
adopted in a small data era, it was simply too difficult for defendants to 
meet.229 Today, however, in a world of automated collection methods and 
analytics, the task of amassing the data is a manageable one.   
 
 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. at 224 (“The difficulty with the record before us . . . is that it does not with any acceptable 
degree of clarity, show when, how often, and under what circumstances the prosecutor alone has been 
responsible for striking those Negroes who have appeared on petit jury panels in Talladega County. The 
record is absolutely silent as to those instances in which the prosecution participated in striking Negroes, 
except for the indication that the prosecutor struck the Negroes in this case and except for those occasions 
when the defendant himself indicated that he did not want Negroes on the jury.”). 
 228. Id. at 227.  
 229. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92–93 (1986) (criticizing the “crippling burden of proof” 
defendants faced under Swain, which left the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges “largely 
immune from constitutional scrutiny”); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239 (2005) (characterizing 
the Swain standard as “unworkable”). Commentators have been equally critical of the Court’s decision 
in Swain. See, e.g., Charles Nesson, Peremptory Challenges: Technology Should Kill Them?, 3 L. 
PROBABILITY & RISK 1, 1 (2004) (characterizing Swain as a “stunningly unjust decision” requiring a 
“ridiculous burden” that is “impossible to meet”).  
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B. Identifying Supposedly Irrelevant Factors230 
Regardless of the degree to which the criminal justice system embraces 
analytics, the system will always maintain a degree of uncertainty. Law 
enforcement officials, prosecutors, judges, and juries will not be replaced 
with fully-predictable robots.231 Some of the uncertainty is preserved by the 
Constitution. For example, unless we are willing to concede that the 
presence of a defense attorney does not affect case outcomes, defendants 
who exercise their right to self-representation232 and forgo the assistance of 
an attorney will likely have a different pattern of results than defendants 
represented by attorneys. Similarly, the Double Jeopardy Clause insulates 
seemingly surprising acquittals from retrial.233 In other instances, non-
constitutional factors will preserve this uncertainty. For example, changes 
in prosecutorial resources or the sudden unavailability of an important 
witness can contribute to unpredictable results. 
The goal of analytics is not to erase all of this unpredictability. Some of 
it is welcome. And even if it is not, it would be impossible to reduce the 
uncertainty to zero. Nonetheless, analytics offers an opportunity to identify 
and reduce the influence of factors that most people agree should be 
irrelevant in prosecutorial decision-making. By measuring and collecting 
data, we can first identify if the system is immune from these factors. Then, 
once we identify which factors are present, prosecutors and courts can 
design systems and policies to limit their influence. 
This Article borrows the focus on identifying supposedly irrelevant 
factors from behavioral economists, who revolutionized traditional 
economic theory by demonstrating the relevance of factors that economists 
have historically overlooked.234 Traditional economic theory is based on the 
premise that decision-makers maximize utility using rational, unbiased 
methods. Underlying this premise is that factors like availability, sunk costs, 
and inertia are supposedly irrelevant to rational decision-makers. Despite 
the simplicity of this model and despite its long-held grasp on economic 
theory, the model does not accurately describe how people actually make 
 
 
 230. See RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 9 (2015) 
(defining “supposedly irrelevant factors” as those that traditional economic theory presumes are not 
related to rational decision-making but that nonetheless influence how actual people make decisions).  
 231. See Roth, supra note 48, at 6–7 (noting that the increase in mechanical adjudication has yet to 
produce calls for robots to replace juries and judges).  
 232. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the 
right of self-representation).  
 233. Otis v. State, 782 S.E.2d 654 (Ga. 2016) (barring retrial on double jeopardy grounds in a 
murder case in which the trial court mistakenly granted a mistrial). 
 234. THALER, supra note 230, at 9 (urging economists and policy makers to “start paying attention 
to those supposedly irrelevant factors”). 
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decisions.235 Rather, behavioral economists have demonstrated that people 
often make decisions that lead to less than optimal results and that these 
non-optimizing decisions—decisions economist Richard H. Thaler cheekily 
characterizes as instances of “misbehavior”—often happen in predictable 
ways.236 Behavioral economists use this information to alter choices so that 
people are less likely to pursue irrational, i.e., sub-optimal, choices. 
The criminal justice system can use analytics to identify when 
prosecutorial decision-making is influenced by factors that most people 
agree should be irrelevant. Prosecutors routinely face complex decisions 
requiring them to consider many factors and competing values. 
Furthermore, prosecutors possess significant discretion in these 
decisions.237 Nonetheless, not all factors are equal. Some factors, like the 
race and sex of potential jurors, are explicitly prohibited from consideration 
by the Constitution.238 For other factors, like political considerations, the 
system is willing to accept that decision-makers will be influenced by them, 
but only up to a point, after which they should become irrelevant. Analytics 
can help identify whether factors that should be irrelevant to the 
prosecutorial function are, in fact, irrelevant.  
The first task is identifying potential supposedly irrelevant factors. Then, 
one must identify the information necessary to determine if a potential 
supposedly irrelevant factor is, in fact, irrelevant, or, on the other hand, if it 
influences the system’s outcomes in an undesirable manner. This Section 
identifies several potential supposedly irrelevant factors. It is not intended 
to be an exhaustive list. Rather, this Section is meant to highlight the value 
of identifying supposedly irrelevant factors in the prosecutorial context and 
thereby encourage scholars and reformers to identify other factors.   
 
 
 235. See generally id. (documenting the slow acceptance of behavioral economic principles).  
 236. Id. at 21–23 (noting that the field of behavioral economics is built on the foundation of 
psychologists who, for example, demonstrated that actual people make decisions based on rules of 
thumb and that this process causes them to make irrational, suboptimal decisions in predictable ways) 
(citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 
SCI. 1124 (1974)). 
 237. See supra Part II.A.  
 238. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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1. Over Politicization 
We accept a certain level of politics in prosecutorial decision-making. 
After all, in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, prosecutors are 
elected officials.239 But beyond a certain point, politically-motivated 
decisions are antithetical to the prosecutorial obligation to seek justice.240 
Of course, identifying that point is often difficult. This is where analytics 
offers promise. Careful collection and analysis of relevant data can help 
identify whether prosecutors cross the line and become too political.  
Recent work by economist Bryan McCannon set out one way to evaluate 
whether prosecutorial decision-making has become too tied to politics.241 
Building on his prior research finding that in jurisdictions where prosecutors 
face reelection the number of felony cases ending in trials increases,242 
McCannon sought to determine if this increase in trials in the run-up to an 
election resulted in less reliable outcomes.243 In short, it did.244  
Similar studies could evaluate whether prosecutors file more cases in the 
aggregate or file more cases of particular types depending on election 
cycles. For example, a recent study found that federal prosecutors’ decisions 
to initiate public corruption charges is influenced by the timing of partisan 
elections.245 The study concluded that public corruption “cases against 
defendants associated with the opposition party are more likely to be filed 
before elections rather than afterward (relative to members of the 
president’s party).”246 The study also found that in the run-up to an election 
federal prosecutors filed charges “more rapidly” against defendants from 
the opposing political party.247 Notably, while McCannon found that 
 
 
 239. See Bryan C. McCannon, Prosecutor Elections, Mistakes, and Appeals, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. 
STUD. 696, 697 n.2 (2013) (documenting that forty-seven states elect state prosecutors and the remaining 
three states have appointed prosecutors).  
 240. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (recognizing that the prosecutor’s goal is 
not to win cases, but to see “that justice shall be done”).  
 241. See McCannon, supra note 239, at 696. 
 242. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C. McCannon, The Effect of the Election of Prosecutors 
on Criminal Trials (Sept. 8, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1641345. 
 243. McCannon, supra note 239, at 697 (using data from criminal appeals from western New York 
state convictions to evaluate whether trials that immediately preceded elections for incumbent 
prosecutors resulted in more reversals on appeal).  
 244. McCannon found that if an “initial felony conviction occurs in the six months prior to a 
reelection, the probability the appellate court will later uphold the conviction decreases by 5.1 to 7.1 
percentage points.” Id. at 698.  
 245. Brendan Nyhan & M. Marit Rehavi, Tipping the Scales? Testing for Political Influence on 
Public Corruption Prosecutions 3 (June 5, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://projects.iq. 
harvard.edu/files/pegroup/files/nyhanrehavi2015.pdf?m=1444765374 (analyzing the timing and results 
of public corruption prosecutions from 1993 to 2008). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
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“hawkish” prosecution decision-making in the run-up to an election 
corresponded with less reliable verdicts,248 “the[] partisan differences in 
case timing do not appear to correspond to less favorable outcomes or more 
punitive treatment of opposition defendants” in public corruption 
prosecutions.249   
2. Potential Arbitrary Factors  
The Court’s rejection of McCleskey’s challenge to Georgia’s capital 
punishment system outlined several potential supposedly irrelevant factors 
that can be explored with analytics.250 For example, the Court cited studies 
examining how the race and sex of criminal justice insiders—attorneys and 
judges—correlate with outcomes.251 It noted other studies that examined 
how “facial characteristics” and the attractiveness of the parties influence 
outcomes.252 The Court was adamant that even if these or similar studies 
demonstrated statistically significant disparities based on these arbitrary 
factors it was not prepared to extend its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
to them.253  
However, the Court’s fear of extending Eighth Amendment protections 
to these or similar arbitrary factors does not mean that we should turn a blind 
eye to the influence of these potentially irrelevant factors. This is 
particularly true today, when analytics can easily identify how arbitrary, 
determinable factors influence outcomes. For example, we could determine 
1) whether and how the experience level of the prosecutor, defense attorney, 
or judge influences outcomes;254 2) if outcomes differ based on whether the 
case is resolved in the weeks before a major holiday or at a different time of 
year; or 3) whether blinding the prosecutor to the race of defendants and 
 
 
 248. See McCannon, supra note 239, at 696. 
 249. See Nyhan & Rehavi, supra note 245, at 4. 
 250. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 317 (1987).  
 251. Id. at 317 nn.41–42. 
 252. Id. at 317–18 nn.43–44. 
 253. Id. at 319 (“The Constitution does not require that a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity 
that correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor . . . .”).  
 254. See, e.g., Miller & Wright, supra note 92, at 164 (documenting that prosecutorial experience 
affected declination rates among prosecutors); Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young 
Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065 (2014). With respect to the influence of judges on 
outcomes, studies identifying outlier judges in the administrative context may prove useful as models. 
See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, & Phillip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007) (documenting discrepancies among 
judges in asylum cases); HAROLD J. KRENT & SCOTT MORRIS, ACHIEVING GREATER CONSISTENCY IN 
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY AND SUGGESTED REFORMS 16–
21 (2013) (identifying outlier administrative law judges in disability claims), https://www.acus. 
gov/sites/default/files/documents/Achieving_Greater_Consistency_Final_Report_4-3-2013_clean.pdf. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
814 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:771 
 
 
 
 
victims affects outcomes.255  
To some degree, each of these factors should be irrelevant in the 
administration of justice. Yet, unless we measure them, we can only 
speculate about their influence.  
C. Charging and Bargaining Decisions 
In December 2015, a reporter contacted me about what he thought was 
a potential abuse of prosecutorial power in Santa Cruz County, Arizona. He 
explained that several people had been charged with kidnapping in cases 
that did not seem to involve kidnapping. He added that none of these 
defendants were ever convicted of kidnapping, and this made him suspect 
that the prosecutor was simply using the kidnapping charge for leverage.256 
I gave him a quick explanation about the near total discretion prosecutors 
possess in charging cases, quickly summarized some of the systemic 
reasons why plea bargaining is so prevalent, and encouraged him to review 
the kidnapping statute, which was likely much broader than he suspected. 
Our conversation ended with him telling me that he planned to contact the 
prosecutor and court to ask them to provide the number of people charged 
and convicted of kidnapping in 2015. I wished him luck, noting that 
obtaining the data was probably going to be a challenge.  
When he called again in early 2016, he explained that both the court and 
the prosecutor told him that they did not maintain that type of information 
and could not easily retrieve it.257 So, the reporter started digging. He 
reviewed published court calendars and identified twenty-one defendants 
charged with kidnapping in 2015.258 Of these, nine were resolved in 2015, 
and each ended in a conviction.259 But in each instance the prosecutor 
dropped the kidnapping charges.260 This trend was consistent with the 
memory of the Chief Criminal Deputy County Attorney. She explained that 
while there had been kidnapping convictions in Santa Cruz, she could not 
 
 
 255. See, e.g., Sah et al., supra note 127. See also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2760 (2015) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting studies that “show that circumstances that ought not to affect the 
application of the death penalty, such as race, gender, or geography, often do”). 
 256. Telephone Interview with Murphy Woodhouse, Reporter, Nogales International (Dec. 17, 
2015).  
 257. See Murphy Woodhouse, Kidnapping Charges Are Common, but Not Convictions, NOGALES 
INT’L (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.nogalesinternational.com/news/kidnapping-charges-are-common-but-
not-convictions/article_b0d95aa8-b341-11e5-b5d2-bbdd82482a87.html (discussing the reporter’s 
attempts to obtain the data).  
 258. Id. The published story indicates that there were more than twenty defendants charged with 
kidnapping. The reporter confirmed to me that the precise number was twenty-one. Telephone Interview 
with Murphy Woodhouse, Reporter, Nogales International (Dec. 17, 2015).  
 259. Woodhouse, supra note 257. 
 260. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/5
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recall a recent example.261  
Of course, the charging practice in Santa Cruz County was 
constitutional.262 Nonetheless, the reporter believed that residents of Santa 
Cruz would be interested in the prosecutor’s practice and should have the 
opportunity and means to evaluate it.263 I agree. We should also be able to 
compare charging practices to other counties and to historical data. 
Analytics makes this possible.  
Several jurisdiction-specific studies have demonstrated the promise of 
using analytics to evaluate both whether charging and bargaining practices 
are constitutional and, even when they are, whether they are desirable.264 
For example, a partnership between the Manhattan District Attorney and the 
Vera Institute of Justice enabled researchers to review the prosecution files 
in over 222,000 cases from 2010–2011.265 The effort confirmed that while 
“there were no noticeable [racial or ethnic] differences” at the initial 
decision point, where prosecutors elected to file charges on cases brought 
to them by the police,266 other trends emerged. For example, misdemeanor 
drug charges were more likely to be dismissed for minority defendants, and 
for all drug offenses—misdemeanors and felonies—prosecutors offered 
more punitive plea offers to minority defendants.267  
Other studies have used analytics to examine how charging decisions 
affect disparate racial outcomes. M. Marit Rehavi and Sonja B. Starr found 
that prosecutors’ charging practices for offenses that imposed mandatory 
minimum sentences explained a significant amount of the racial disparity in 
 
 
 261. Id.  
 262. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (noting that “although prosecutorial 
discretion is broad, it is not unfettered. Selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws is . . . subject to 
constitutional constraints.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 
364 (1978) (charging decisions may not be “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as 
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification” (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962))). See 
also Pathological Politics, supra note 89, at 558 (“The commitment to prosecutorial discretion rules out 
aggressive equal protection review of charging decisions, the kind of review that would seek out and 
correct enforcement disparities among different population groups and would bar irregular and sporadic 
enforcement altogether.”). 
 263. Cf. Harmon, supra note 93, at 781 (“Constitutional rights are structurally incapable of 
encouraging law enforcement to impose only necessary, fair, and efficient harms on legitimate 
individuals interests. They are also unable to require that the means and goals for law enforcement do 
not undermine the lived experience of individuals and communities. When law enforcement and 
individual interests collide, constitutional rights alone cannot delineate the appropriate balance between 
the two.”).  
 264. See, e.g., BESIKI KUTATELADZE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, DO RACE AND ETHNICITY 
MATTER IN PROSECUTION? A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES (2012) (summarizing thirty-four peer 
reviewed empirical studies published between 1990 and 2011).  
 265. See Kutateladze, supra note 30.  
 266. Id. at 83.  
 267. Id. at pt. VI–X.  
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federal sentences for black and white offenders in the federal system.268 For 
similar offenses and similar offenders federal prosecutors filed charges that 
required mandatory minimum sentences 65 percent more often against 
black defendants as compared to white defendants.269 
While many studies focus on the racial implications of prosecutorial 
charging decisions, analytics can deliver relevant information about 
additional factors, including factors that do not raise constitutional 
concerns. For example, we could track: 1) how often the crime of arrest 
corresponds to the charged crime and to the ultimate conviction; 2) which 
crimes are complements in the sense that they are often charged together; 
3) how often a particular crime is charged and how often it is dropped (and 
at what stage); and 4) whether these actions correlate with a host of variables 
including, the race and gender of the defendant and victim, whether the 
defendant is in custody pre-trial, or whether the defendant is represented by 
a private or public defense attorney. Importantly, this information could be 
compared among prosecutors, across different prosecutorial offices, and 
over time.270 
This type of analysis would dramatically increase transparency, 
providing a more accurate account of how prosecutors exercise their 
charging and bargaining discretion.271 Prosecutorial insiders could use this 
information to regulate practices.272 The public could use this to evaluate 
prosecutorial performance.273 And, armed with a more complete picture of 
how prosecutors exercise their discretion, judges may be less reluctant to 
conclude that they are “ill-suited”274 to regulate these discretionary 
decisions.275  
 
 
 268. M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 J. POL. 
ECON. 1320 (2014).  
 269. Id. at 1350. 
 270. A recent report from the Fair Punishment Project at Harvard Law School is one small-scale 
example of identifying prosecutorial outliers with respect to charging decisions in capital cases. 
DEADLIEST PROSECUTORS, supra note 31 (arguing that the personality-driven capital punishment regime 
undermines its constitutional legitimacy).  
 271. See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 7, at xi (noting that a focus on aggregate conviction rates and 
guilty plea rates “fails to take into account the trend of bringing multiple counts for a single incident . . 
. as well as the creativity of prosecutors in hatching up criminal cases where no crime exists and the 
overcriminalization of virtually every aspect of American life.”) (footnote omitted).  
 272. See Miller & Wright, supra note 92, at 189 (noting that “[d]ata triggers can also alert agents 
and supervisors to decisions that fall outside of the norm”); Bibas, supra note 23, at 1001–02 (“Computer 
tracking and frequent statistical reports can reinforce oversight and implementation of district attorneys’ 
priorities.”).  
 273. Bibas, supra note 23, at 1012 (“Head prosecutors and outsiders are better able to review 
systemic patterns than individual decisions.”). 
 274. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). 
 275. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2760–61 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (relying 
on empirical studies to conclude that the death penalty should be unconstitutional, in part, because “the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/5
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D. Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations 
Prosecutorial efforts to game the system by failing to disclose favorable 
evidence to defendants276 have resulted in several notable miscarriages of 
justice277 and attracted widespread condemnation.278 Scholars and 
practitioners have proposed reforms to minimize misconduct. In other work, 
I proposed a low-tech model for encouraging compliance with Brady—
simply asking prosecutors about their disclosure decisions on-the-record in 
pretrial proceedings.279 Analytics offers an additional solution. However, 
unlike using analytics to evaluate: 1) jury selection; 2) the influence of 
arbitrary factors in prosecutorial decisions; and 3) charging practices, there 
are no empirical studies demonstrating the ability of analytics to minimize 
Brady violations. Despite this void, there are several reasons to believe that 
analytics could prove to be an effective tool.  
The ultimate goal is to use analytics to identify potential Brady violators 
before they commit misconduct. Scholars have performed some of the 
theoretical work to make this possible by identifying characteristics that 
might make it more likely that a prosecutor will violate Brady. For example, 
Miriam Baer applied behavioral economics and psychology to Brady, 
explaining that prosecutors’ decisions to comply with Brady likely are 
affected by the timing of when they identify favorable material.280 She 
concluded that behavioral models predict that a “prosecutor’s . . . 
incentive[] to cheat increase[s] as a prosecution progresses” and the 
prosecutor’s “relative preferences [for violating Brady] also change.”281 
This insight has a strong theoretical foundation, and analytics can help 
confirm or disprove it. If confirmed, this finding could focus efforts to 
encourage disclosure on the points in a case where prosecutors are more 
likely to shirk their discovery obligations.  
Where Baer’s work explores the timing of Brady violations, other 
 
 
decisionmaking authority, the legal discretion, and ultimately the power of the local prosecutor” allow 
“circumstances that ought not to affect application of the death penalty, such as race, gender, or 
geography” to drive its use).  
 276. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  
 277. See, e.g., In re Special Proceedings, 842 F. Supp. 2d 232 (D.D.C. 2012) (documenting the 
prosecutorial misconduct in the prosecution of Senator Ted Stevens); MICHAEL MORTON, GETTING 
LIFE: AN INNOCENT MAN’S 25-YEAR JOURNEY FROM PRISON TO PEACE (2014); Milke v. Mroz, 339 
P.3d 659 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) (barring the prosecutor from retrying Milke based on its misconduct 
during her initial trial).  
 278. See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 7; United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“There is an epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the land.”).  
 279. See Jason Kreag, The Brady Colloquy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47 (2014).  
 280. Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2015).  
 281. Id. at 39.  
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research sheds light on potential characteristics that might make individual 
prosecutors more likely to commit misconduct. For example, Ronald F. 
Wright’s and Kay L. Levine’s research confirms that prosecutors believe 
that they become less adversarial, less rigid, and more focused on achieving 
justice as opposed to winning convictions as they gain experience.282 
Experienced prosecutors are also more likely to acknowledge and 
appreciate the important role defense attorneys play in the system, 
characterizing defense attorneys as essential to achieving justice as opposed 
to an unnecessary check on the otherwise righteous work of the 
prosecutor.283 If these self-reported perceptions are accurate, Wright’s and 
Levine’s research demonstrates that inexperienced prosecutors are 
theoretically more likely to commit Brady violations than experienced 
prosecutors.284 Here again, empirical work powered by analytics can test 
this theory, thereby helping to focus reforms designed to bolster compliance 
with Brady on prosecutors more likely to commit misconduct.  
Furthermore, analytics could help determine if theories of criminal 
conduct are helpful for identifying prosecutors more likely to commit Brady 
violations. For example, the equivalent of the broken windows theory of 
policing in the Brady context might be that prosecutors who have unusually 
high rates of having their evidentiary objections overruled or the objections 
of their adversaries sustained might be more likely to commit Brady 
violations. Or, applying something similar to the social contacts analysis 
police use to identify potential bad actors, it might be that prosecutors who 
work on the same prosecutorial team or in the same office with other 
prosecutors who have been found to have violated Brady might be more 
likely to commit misconduct in the future.  
Analytics could also identify what types of cases are more likely to 
involve Brady issues and what type of information—e.g., impeachment 
evidence, information supporting a defendant’s alibi, evidence of third-
party guilt—is more likely to be withheld.285 Identifying these trends could 
aid defendants in tailoring their discovery requests, assist judges inclined to 
actively police prosecutor’s disclosure decisions,286 and aid prosecutors who 
 
 
 282. Wright & Levine, supra note 254.  
 283. Id. at 1092–94.  
 284. The overly competitive and aggressive approach of inexperienced prosecutors is not the only 
reason they may be more likely to violate Brady. Brady relies on prosecutors to anticipate how the 
defense could use the potentially favorable evidence. Inexperienced prosecutors may simply fail to 
recognize how a piece of evidence could help the defense.  
 285. Professor Brandon Garrett has attempted a similar task with respect to wrongful convictions. 
See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO 
WRONG (2011). 
 286. See United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) 
(arguing that “[o]nly judges can put a stop to” ongoing Brady violations); Kreag, supra note 279 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/5
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otherwise want to meet their obligations but sometimes fail despite good 
intentions. 
In this context, the application of analytics is more aspirational than it is 
for using analytics to evaluate jury selection, charging practices, or in 
fleshing out the influence of arbitrary factors in prosecutorial decision-
making. Much of the data collection needed to apply analytics to these areas 
is routinely done. However, in the Brady context, the focus is more on the 
first step of analytics— assembling the data. Nonetheless, analytics offers 
promise and should be included in the reforms designed to minimize Brady 
violations.  
IV. THE CHALLENGES OF PROSECUTORIAL ANALYTICS 
A. Risks of Analytics 
Increased reliance on data analytics carries risks. Some of the risks are 
similar to those associated with using analytics to fight crime. Others are 
context specific. They include: 1) the opportunity costs of foregoing other 
potentially worthy efforts to improve the justice system; 2) the possibility 
of focusing on the wrong data or failing to uncover “bugs” in the analytical 
tools; 3) the tendency of a data-centric approach to crowd out other 
important values; and 4) the possibility that we might be uncomfortable with 
what we learn.  
Expanding analytics to the prosecutorial function will incur new costs as 
the system collects vast amounts of currently uncollected data. These costs 
will force tradeoffs. For example, if the costs are associated with promoting 
defense interests, funding them will put additional pressure on the existing 
strapped budgets of public defense agencies.287 To the extent prosecutorial 
agencies are asked to incur the costs, they lack the incentive to adopt the 
optimal amount of data collection and analytics because the benefits of these 
measures extend beyond the prosecutor’s office.288 However, if the New 
Orleans District Attorney’s Office is at all representative, there is evidence 
that prosecuting agencies have the capacity to absorb some of the additional 
 
 
(proposing that judges conduct a colloquy regarding prosecutorial disclosures pretrial and pre-plea). 
 287. Jennifer Laurin made this point in the context of calls for public defenders to adopt analytics 
to improve the provision of indigent defense services. Laurin, supra note 53, at 355 (“Time and energy 
spent leaning on public defenders to gather better data might trade off . . . with funding to alleviate 
caseloads or hire defense investigators.”).  
 288. Harmon, supra note 90, at 1131 (“[P]olice chiefs and politicians experience much of the cost 
of increased investment in obtaining information—in the form of delayed decision-making, opportunity 
costs, and increased accountability—but usually internalize only some of the benefits of improved 
policy.”).  
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costs of data collection.289 Furthermore, to the extent that analytics 
documents that prosecutorial decision-making creates negative 
externalities, equity considerations point to requiring prosecutors to 
internalize these costs.  
Beyond the resource question, increased reliance on analytics carries the 
risk of relying on bad inputs. Focusing on the wrong data points, using 
inaccurate data, and failing to detect “bugs” in the analytical process would 
severely compromise outputs. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that 
prosecutorial decisions are often complex and involve competing values 
that may not be easily mapped with determinable variables.290 To some 
degree, these problems have plagued the use of analytics on the crime-
fighting side of the system.291 For example, criminal records often include 
errors.292 And heat lists, local DNA databases, and other predictive policing 
techniques are bound to be over-inclusive, sweeping up large numbers of 
innocent people. Similar errors in the data could plague the use of analytics 
to evaluate prosecutorial decision-making. 
There are other more abstract risks. Several scholars have argued that 
the focus on data may crowd out important and less easily quantifiable 
values in the criminal justice system. Kevin Lapp laments the “pathology of 
‘dataveillance’ [which] nearly always sees the solution as more data 
collection and greater dissemination.”293 Others worry that to the extent that 
data anonymizes decisions, there is a risk that there is less room for 
empathy.294 In a twist, Justice Thomas used a related argument to challenge 
Justice Breyer’s use of analytics in his Eighth Amendment analysis of 
 
 
 289. See Miller & Wright, supra note 92, at 189 (“NODA was no better funded than a typical district 
attorney’s office. Yet Harry Connick and his staff decided that they could better achieve their goals by 
shifting significant resources—from a very tight budget—into record-keeping, recording, and 
reviewing.”).  
 290. Laurin, supra note 53, at 356 (noting that using analytical tools to evaluate the provision of 
indigent defense services is challenging because of the lack of agreement about “what good defense 
practice is aiming to achieve”); Roth, supra note 48, at 1264–65 (noting that changes in substantive law 
that focus criminality on determinable variables as opposed to complex value judgments have allowed 
for a more mechanized adjudication process).  
 291. Roth, supra note 48, at 1270 (noting the “hidden subjectivities and errors that often go 
unrecognized and unchecked”). These errors extend beyond crime-fighting. See, e.g., Ambrose v. 
Booker, 684 F.3d 638, 640–42 (6th Cir. 2012) (documenting that a “computer glitch” in software used 
to create jury lists caused “the systematic underrepresentation of African-Americans in the jury pools of 
Kent County, Michigan”).  
 292. See MADELINE NIEGHLY & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WANTED: 
ACCURATE FBI BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT (2013), http://www.nelp.org/content/ 
uploads/2015/02/Report-Wanted-Accurate-FBI-Background-Checks-Employment-1.pdf.  
 293. Lapp, supra note 52, at 7 (quoting Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and 
Dataveillance, 31 COMM. ACM 498, 499, 502–04 (1988)).  
 294. See, e.g., Sah et al., supra note 127, at 73 (cautioning that an attempt to reduce racial biases by 
blinding prosecutors to the race of defendants risks “other unintended effects, such as reducing empathy, 
leading to harsher decisions toward anonymous defendants”).  
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capital punishment in Glossip. Justice Thomas warned against making 
constitutional decisions based on “cold mathematical calculations.”295  
Finally, there is the risk that using analytics to evaluate prosecutorial 
decision-making may reveal too much about the system, including aspects 
of it that we would rather not acknowledge. This fear animated the Court’s 
unwillingness to include the robust statistical analysis in evaluating 
McCleskey’s constitutional claims.296 In McCleskey, the Court feared 
analytics because it might produce too much justice. Such a position 
maintains the status quo, where “lawyers and judges [and the public] are 
inculcated with the notion that the system works well and there is nothing 
to worry about.”297 Analytics offers the opportunity to test our faith that the 
system works well.298 
B. Mandatory Prosecutorial Disclosures 
Realizing the promise of analytics will require building robust data sets 
that reflect the myriad decisions prosecutors make in every case and making 
this data widely available. Much of the necessary data is tucked away in 
prosecutorial files and currently preserved, if at all, in ways that make 
aggregating it costly. Consequently, prosecutors will play an essential role 
in collecting this data. Some believe that prosecutors will, eventually, 
undertake this responsibility voluntarily.299 But given the benefits 
prosecutors receive from their current private and discretion-filled system, 
waiting for them to voluntarily undertake this effort would likely prove 
futile. Rather, in exchange for the immense power society cedes to 
prosecutors, we should require that prosecutors collect, certify, and disclose 
certain data. There are at least four reasons for cautious optimism that a 
mandatory prosecutorial disclosure regime is possible.  
First, there is more openness to the possibility of extensive substantive 
reform of the criminal justice system in today’s political climate than in the 
past. Interest groups from across the political spectrum have criticized mass 
 
 
 295. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2752 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 296. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314–15 (1987) (“McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical 
conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”).  
 297. Kozinski, supra note 7, at xviii.  
 298. See, e.g., Kutateladze, supra note 30, at iv (“The shame is not in finding that we have 
unconscious biases or that our current policies have a disproportionate racial impact—the shame lies in 
refusing to ask the questions and correct the problems.”). 
 299. Miller & Wright, supra note 92, at 195 (“Perhaps down the road, prosecutors who gain 
confidence in the institutional and political viability of detailed internal data collection and analysis will 
be willing to share portions of that data directly with the public.”).  
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incarceration and its accompanying costs.300 Scholars have begun to point 
to the prosecutor’s discretionary power as the driver of our incarceration 
rate.301 Simultaneously, several high profile cases crumbled as a result of 
prosecutorial misconduct or related abuses of power.302 Taken together, 
these factors provide room for the seeds of reform to grow. Furthermore, 
requiring data collection is a soft form of oversight. It does not mandate how 
prosecutors exercise their discretion in any one case. It only collects data 
about these decisions.  
Second, public and private funding streams increasingly promote the use 
of evidence-based practices and require robust data collection and analysis 
as a condition of funding. These funding conditions have been common for 
programs designed to develop analytics as a crime-fighting tool.303 And they 
have slowly begun to reach defense interests.304 Furthermore, the 
jurisdiction-specific studies, often funded by these same public and private 
organizations, have helped demonstrate the promise of the widespread use 
of analytics to evaluate prosecutorial decision-making.  
Third, there is precedent for requiring prosecutors to collect and disclose 
data about their discretionary decisions. In the federal system, the 
Department of Justice mandates that prosecutors collect information related 
to plea agreements, declinations, and the use of informants. All negotiated 
plea agreements must be reduced to writing, approved by a supervising 
attorney, and recorded and filed in court.305 Similarly, when federal 
prosecutors decline to pursue a case, they are required to communicate their 
reasons to the investigating agency.306 And when they agree not to press 
charges in exchange for assistance from a cooperating witness, prosecutors 
 
 
 300. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 135 (providing a critique of over-criminalization from the Heritage 
Foundation); Orin Kerr, Koch Industries Gives Grant to NACDL “To Address the Nation’s Profound 
Indigent Defense Crisis,” WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost. 
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 301. See supra note 133.  
 302. See supra note 277.  
 303. See Laurin, supra note 53, at 337 (noting the prominent role of federal grants in promoting and 
researching evidence-based policing techniques and in improving data collection methods for law 
enforcement); Data-Driven Decision Making, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., 
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 304. Laurin, supra note 53, at 337 (“Consistent with the approach of NIJ and BJA to the criminal 
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prioritized the development and promotion of an evidence base, especially in support of cost-efficient 
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must prepare a written record of the details of the agreement.307 These 
provisions help ensure consistency across cases and federal districts.308 
They also form the ingredients for a rich data set that could be used to 
identify trends and outliers in prosecuting agencies.  
Finally, there are slivers of support for requiring mandatory 
prosecutorial disclosures in the First and Sixth Amendment rights that 
ensure public participation in the criminal justice system. Together these 
constitutional protections are designed to increase transparency and 
accountability in the system.309 Jocelyn Simonson has argued that in a world 
with very few trials the regulatory force of the constitutional guarantee of a 
public trial must extend to pretrial proceedings, including those from which 
the public is routinely excluded.310 Preserving a physical audience to 
promote transparency and accountability is undoubtedly important to 
ensuring that the public has the opportunity to evaluate the ultimate results 
of prosecutorial power. These same constitutional principles support 
transparency with respect to the prosecutor’s decision-making process that 
brings about the results.  
CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, law enforcement will continue to extract the maximum 
crime-fighting capabilities of analytics. But there is little reason why this 
tool should be confined to one part of the criminal justice system. Failing to 
collect and measure robust data sets about the prosecutorial function risks 
the institution becoming anachronistic in modern society, which has shown 
an insatiable appetite for trying to improve decision-making with data. More 
importantly, it risks preserving individual and institutional biases in the 
system that could otherwise be identified with analytics. This Article 
outlines a path forward to replace the data-poor environment surrounding 
prosecutorial power. This path offers promise for regulating and improving 
the institution of the prosecutor.  
 
 
 307. See id. at 9-27.650.  
 308. See, e.g., id. at 9-27.450B (“Written agreements will facilitate efforts by the Department or the 
Sentencing Commission to monitor compliance by prosecutors with Department policies and the 
guidelines.”).  
 309. See Simonson, supra note 28, at 2196 (arguing that the First and Sixth Amendment rights to a 
public trial “concentrate on the function of the local audience as a check on abuses of power and a 
mechanism of democratic accountability”).  
 310. Id. at 2176 (“[T]he protections of the Sixth and First Amendment rights to a public trial extend 
with full force into the nontrial criminal courtroom.”). 
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